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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
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This thesis contains the following papers:
Fricke, L., Quaas, M.F. (2015), The Economic Causes of Regime Shifts in Marine
Ecosystems, unpublished manuscript
Fricke, L., Quaas, M.F. (2015), The Economic Consequences of Regime Shifts in
Marine Ecosystems, unpublished manuscript
Fricke, L. (2015), Economic Drivers of Regime Shifts in Optimally Managed Fish-
eries, unpublished manuscript
Section 1.2 contains a short description of my contribution to each of those papers.
The following paper is not part of this thesis:
Doering, R. Goti, L., Fricke, L., Jantzen, K. (2015), Equity and ITQs: About fair
distribution in quota management systems in ﬁsheries, forthcoming in Environmen-
tal Values
1.1 Motivation
Natural systems are often characterized by limited resilience and the possibility of regime
shifts as a consequence of exogenous shocks (Scheﬀer et al., 2001). Examples include
populations with a minimum population size below which extinction is inevitable (e.g.,
Gould 1972; Berck 1979; Bulte and van Kooten 2000), and ecological systems with com-
plex interactions between the various components of the system such as shallow lakes and
semi-arid rangelands (e.g., Mäler et al. 2003; Anderies et al. 2002).
The ecological literature typically considers regime shifts to be undesirable or even
'catastrophic' (Scheﬀer et al., 2001; Scheﬀer and Carpenter, 2003). This implies that
strengthening resilience of natural systems should be a precondition for sustainability
(Arrow et al., 1995; Levin et al., 1998; Perrings, 2006).
This thesis takes a new look at this issue by investigating the economic causes and
consequences of regime shifts in marine ecosystems. In the following three chapters I
study (a) the underlying economic causes of ﬁshery collapse when ﬁshing is unregulated,
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(b) the implications for eﬃciency when an ecosystem experiences a shift, and (c) how an
optimal management by itself can lead into regime shifts and species collapse.
The thread connecting the three articles in this thesis is not exclusively the overall
topic 'regime shifts' but also the theoretical ecological-economic model that my supervi-
sor Martin Quaas and I developed over the last years. It proved to be not only enduring
but also versatile. I safe details for later.
Rather I want to focus here on the motivation behind looking further into the economics
of regime shifts. In particular I want to describe the famous case of a collapsed ﬁshery
and what it meant for an entire region in the North-West Atlantic: Newfoundland and
Labrador. In my opinion, the case of Newfoundland is exceptionally well suited to explain
the economic and ecologic reasoning behind many ideas in my thesis. Although I was
only able to use this case study in the very last chapter of this thesis, Newfoundland
provides anecdotal evidence for most of the modeling choices we made in the following
articles.1
Newfoundland holds some of the poorest, most ﬁshery dependent provinces of Canada
(Hamilton and Butler, 2001). Historically the cod ﬁshery has been economically im-
mensely important for Newfoundland & Labrador, and attracted an international ﬁshing
ﬂeet for almost ﬁve centuries. By the late 1960s foreign overﬁshing had already severely
depleted the Newfoundland cod stocks. The International Commission for the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) ﬁrst established quotas and total allowable catches (TACs) in
the early 1970s but severly overestimated stock levels. Canada established an extended
200 mile exclusive economic zone in 1977 leading to a boom period for the local cod
ﬁshery. The number of registered ﬁshermen in Newfoundland increased from 14.000 in
1976 to 34.000 in 1981 (Schrank, 2005).
In the early eighties catches fell dramatically and by the early 1990's the northern
cod stocks ﬁnally collapsed. In 1992 Canada imposed a moratorium of the northern
1 Additionally, I was lucky enough (thanks to Martin's generosity) to travel to Newfoundland in
autumn 2011 and discover for myself the consequences of a massive ecosystem regime shift that resulted
in the collapse of the northern cod stocks in the early 1990s.
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cod ﬁshery. The ﬁshery was reopened on a small scale in the late 1990's but closed
again shortly after. Directed ﬁshing through stewardship and recreational ﬁsheries was
reopened on a very small scale in 2006 (DFO, 2014).
Although the story of the Newfoundland cod ﬁshery plays only a minor part in the
following three chapters, it brings up a number of issues that we used to motivate 'our'
theoretical model of a ﬁshery. The ﬁrst and most important one is the dependency of a
local economy on ﬁsh. This includes factor markets for both workers and capital such
as ﬁshing vessels and gear. The number of ﬁshermen along with the whole branch of
ﬁsh processing and trading that depends on a ﬁshery does not only play a big part when
assessing consequences of regime shifts and ﬁshery collapses but may as well be one of
their main causes. The same may be true for the demand for ﬁsh: If a local economy
heavily depends on a ﬁsh species as a source of protein one would assume that pressure
on stocks remains high even when stock levels are decreasing. The idea that both factor
markets and output markets are possible causes of regime shifts is the main focus of the
article in chapter 2 of this thesis.
Today, it is generally accepted that the main reason for the collapse of the New-
foundland cod is overﬁshing (Walters and Maguire, 1996; Myers et al., 1996, 1997).2
Invertebrates (northern shrimp, snow crab, american lobster) increased in abundance af-
ter the Newfoundland cod stocks collapsed (Worm and Myers, 2003; Frank et al., 2005;
Boudreau et al., 2011). It is suspected that the ecosystem at the Canadian east coast
shifted towards a new stable equilibrium, where cod stocks remain at a low level while
other species biomass levels, especially cod prey, including forage ﬁshes, shrimp and large
crustaceans remain high (Bundy, 2001; Worm and Myers, 2003; Rice, 2002; Bundy and
Fanning, 2005).
Predator-prey relations similar to the ones described above can be found in virtually
all ﬁsheries around the globe. They are important determinants of system dynamics and
stability. In Chapter 3 and 4 predator-prey relations between diﬀerent species play an
important role in determining management choices and consequences in the presence of
2 Other theories included increased natural mortality due to environmental factors, harp seal predation,
competition by pelagics and inaccurancy in stock estimation(Myers et al., 1996).
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regime shifts.
The cod moratorium in Newfoundland set around 30 000 people (around 12% of the
labor force) out of work immediately. Many outport populations are declining and depend
increasingly on governmental transfers (Hamilton and Butler, 2001). However, after
the cod moratorium the cod ﬁshery was replaced by shellﬁsh, caplin, halibut and other
ﬁsheries. The lobster ﬁshery was already an established tradition but grew increasingly
important after the cod moratorium. By the mid 1990s shrimp and snow crab landings
quadrupled (tripled) compared to 1990. By 2002 the total value of Newfoundland landings
increased about 60% in real terms compared to 1990 (Schrank, 2005). In 2008, these
ﬁsheries provided direct employment for about 25,000 workers.
From the description above we take that the idea of local factor and demand markets,
and interactions between harvested species may complicate the assessment of manage-
ment decisions, and consequences of regime shifts in a marine setting. Corresponding to
that, chapter 3 of this thesis particularly focuses on dealing with the question who gains
and who looses from a ﬁshery collapse.
All of the presented work is just a ﬁrst step in understanding the economic factors behind
regime shifts. While the case of Newfoundland may appear as outdated, today's ﬁsheries
in the developing world are often managed poorly and many species are at the brink of
collapse. At the same time, many regions are still strongly dependent on ﬁsheries as the
main source of food and employment. Hence, the question how to deal with possible
and actual shifts is more pressing than ever. This thesis contributes to the discussion by
exposing the relationship between the resource dependency of local economies and regime
shifts. It speciﬁes ways to asses the aftermath of regime shifts on the local economy, i.e
the changes in economic beneﬁts for diﬀerent stakeholders.
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1.2 Contributions
Here I brieﬂy describe my contribution to the individual chapters.
• Chapter 2: This paper is joint work with Martin Quaas. Martin Quaas came up
with the general idea to use local input and output markets to explain ﬁshery
collapse. We worked together on the technical implementation. The analysis, the
empirical part and most of the writing, were done by myself.
• Chapter 3: This paper is joint work with Martin Quaas. The theoretical part stems
mostly from our previous work in Chapter 2. The empirical part and the writing
were mostly done by myself.
• Chapter 4: The theoretical part stems mostly from our previous work in Chapter 2.
I am the single author of this paper although it beneﬁted from extensive discussions
between Martin Quaas and myself.
2. THE ECONOMIC CAUSES OF REGIME SHIFTS IN MARINE
ECOSYSTEMS
with Martin F. Quaas
St John's, Newfoundland
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2.1 Introduction: Regime Shifts and Fishery Collapses
Many natural systems are characterized by limited resilience and the possibility of regime
shifts as a consequence of exogenous shocks (Scheﬀer et al., 2001). Evidence for regime
shifts in the late 1980s and early 1990s has been documented for marine ecosystems all
across the Northern hemisphere (Choi et al., 2004, 2005; Beaugrand, 2004; Weijerman
et al., 2005; Kenny et al., 2009; Moellmann et al., 2009; Hare and Mantua, 2000; Overland
et al., 2008; Conversi et al., 2010). In the scientiﬁc literature it is assumes that these
almost synchronous events were triggered by common drivers associated with climate
variables, but trophic cascades caused by overﬁshing have been observed as well in many
marine ecosystems that experienced a regime shift (Moellmann, 2011). In this vein,
Neubauer et al. (2013) show that prolonged intense exploitation reduces resilience of
harvested ﬁsh stocks. Additionally, it has been shown that consumer preferences for
variety, or technical progress in harvesting, may trigger or hasten stock collapse (Squires
and Vestergaard, 2013; Quaas and Requate, 2013). Thus, while overexploitation impedes
the resilience of the system, another external driver (i.e. changing climate variables) may
give the ﬁnal impulse for the marine ecosystem to shift to another state (Moellmann,
2011).
We contribute to the discussion on the reasons of ﬁsheries collapse by looking at local
economic drivers (i.e. input and output market conditions) and derive conditions under
which stock collapse is or is not an equilibrium outcome of unregulated ﬁshing. We explain
how input and output market conditions shape the open-access harvest function and, by
that, aﬀect the resilience of a ﬁshery. To derive an empirically applicable form of the open-
access harvesting function, we specify iso-elastic market supply functions for capital and
labor, and derive the open-access catch quantity in market equilibrium as a function of
the current stock size. We ﬁnd that collapse is an open-access equilibrium under the
following conditions: (i) the supply of labor and capital to the ﬁshery is inelastic. This
is the case for example if coastal economies have few employment alternatives outside
the ﬁshery. (ii) Consumer demand for ﬁsh is inelastic. This means that there are few
close substitutes available for ﬁsh harvested from the corresponding stock (Quaas and
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Requate, 2013). (iii) Harvesting costs do not depend strongly on the stock size. This
latter eﬀect has been discussed previously in resource economics (Clark, 1990) and known
in the ﬁsheries literature as hyperstability (Harley et al., 2001).
We apply our theoretical model using stock assessment data for 179 ﬁsheries for which
we estimate open-access harvest functions. We employ a stock-based indicator for stock
collapse that is a modiﬁcation of the classiﬁcations proposed by Worm et al. (2006) and
Costello et al. (2008). Using estimated values for the model parameters and classiﬁcation
of stock collapse, we show that the probability of a ﬁsheries collapse is aﬀected by the
shape of the open-access harvest function in the predicted way.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2.2 we set up our theo-
retical bioeconomic ﬁshery model and derive the non-linear open-access harvest function.
In section 2.3 we present estimates for open-access harvest functions for several ﬁsh-
eries using a global database for harvest and stock estimates. We then link our ﬁndings
about the open-access harvest structure to observed ﬁshery collapses using a non-linear
probability estimation approach. The ﬁnal section brieﬂy concludes.
2.2 A Model of an Open-Access Fishery
In the following we set up the model for an open-access ﬁshery. In everything that fol-
lows we consider a ﬁshery on a single stock, abstracting from any biological, technical,
or market-interactions between ﬁsheries. Ecological factors driving population dynamics
(and collapse) are diverse and often controversial. We aim at ﬁnding economic mecha-
nisms that may contribute to stock collapses, and thus adopt a fairly general model on
the ecological side. Biomass growth x˙ depend on stock growth before harvest g(x) and
harvest quantity h:
x˙ = g(x)− h . (2.1)
We assume that stock biomass growth is zero at a zero stock size, g(0) = 0, and that
marginal growth of the stock is ﬁnite and positive for very small stock sizes, 0 < g′(0) <
∞. These assumptions suﬃce to show the principal results from our theoretical model.
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Many ﬁsheries focus on a species with no close substitutes, are suﬃciently large to
aﬀect the world price or simply serve local markets. Constant output prices are not a
reasonable assumption for any of these. We thus assume an iso-elastic inverse demand
function for the harvest,
p(h) = p¯ h−ν , (2.2)
where ν is the inverse price elasticity of demand, where we assume 0 ≤ ν < 1. The
restriction ν < 1 means that revenues p h will increase with harvest.
Harvesting is described by the generalized Gordon-Schaefer industry production func-
tion (Gordon, 1954; Schaefer, 1957),
h = q(x) E, (2.3)
where q(x) > 0 denotes the `catchability', which depends positively on stock size, q′(x) >
0. As common in the literature, we use the speciﬁcation q(x) = q exp(ρ t)xχ, where
q > 0 is the productivity parameter, ρ ≥ 0 is the rate of exogenous technical progress,
and χ > 0 is the stock-output elasticity or schooling parameter (Clark, 1990). We use
E to denote the ﬁshing eﬀort, which can be thought of as an intermediate product that
itself is produced by means of labor l and capital k input. We follow Hannesson (1983b),
and assume a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function
E = lϕ k1−ϕ (2.4)
with ϕ ∈ (0, 1).
Fisheries often do not only provide an important source of protein for the local popu-
lation, but are major sources for employment and foster local capital markets for vessels,
gear etc. We assume that the production input, capital and labor, are supplied on local
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markets. We furthermore assume upward sloping iso-elastic inverse supply functions,
w(l) = ω lζ , (2.5)
r(k) = κ kψ, (2.6)
with ω, κ, ζ, ψ > 0. For capital, this captures that ﬁshing capital may be only partially
malleable (Clark et al., 1979). One cannot easily use gear and vessels employed in one
ﬁshery in a ﬁshery for a diﬀerent species. For labor, an upward sloping supply curve
translates into diﬀerences in employment alternatives for workers in the ﬁshing industry
that could be explained by diﬀerent skill sets. When labor and capital supply is perfectly
elastic, ζ = 0 and ψ = 0, the wage and capital rental rates are ﬁxed at some `world
market' levels, w = ω and r = κ.
We assume that ﬁshermen minimize their costs, taking factor market prices as given.
Because of constant returns to scale in eﬀort production, harvesting cost is a non-linear
function of factor prices w and r and a linear function of harvest, and given by
C˜(h,w, r;x) =
wϕ r1−ϕ
ϕϕ (1− ϕ)1−ϕ
h
q xχ exp(ρ t)
. (2.7)
Because of this linearity, marginal cost are equal to average cost. Under conditions of
open access, ﬁshermen will increase their harvest level until marginal proﬁt is zero, and
also the level of proﬁt is zero  for given prices on factor and output markets. The
resulting open-access condition is
p =
wϕ r1−ϕ
ϕϕ (1− ϕ)1−ϕ
1
q xχ exp(ρ t)
(2.8)
If prices on output and factor markets were constant, as in the Gordon-Schaefer frame-
work, this condition determines a unique open-access stock size.
With imperfectly elastic supply of factors l and k, their prices depend on the eﬀort
level in factor market equilibrium, however. We show in Appendix 2.5.1 that factor
prices increase in the harvest level, and that the market equilibrium cost function is the
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following non-linear function of harvest and current stock biomass:
C(h, x) = C
(
h
xχ exp (ρ t)
)e+1
, (2.9a)
with C > 0, and
e = ζ
ϕ(1 + ψ)
1 + ζ(1− ϕ) + ψϕ + ψ
(1− ϕ)(1 + ζ)
1 + ζ(1− ϕ) + ψϕ > 0. (2.9b)
The equilibrium cost function decreases with stock size and increases over-proportionally
with harvest quantity, leading to unit costs that are increasing in harvest. This speciﬁc
characteristic of the cost function results from the term e > 0. The expression for e in
equation (2.9b) consists of two parts: The ﬁrst part is derived from the equilibrium in the
labor market, and the second part from the equilibrium in the capital market. The input
market eﬀect e is increasing in the elasticities of both labor and capital supply (ψ and
ζ). The more elastic the supply of inputs, the more elastic the equilibrium cost function
reacts to changes in the harvest level. For a perfectly elastic labor supply (ζ = 0), the
ﬁrst term of (2.9b) vanishes, for a perfectly elastic capital supply (ψ = 0), the second
term disappears. For perfectly elastic factor supply, the cost function (2.9) reduces to
C(h, x) = c h x−χ exp (ρ t), and the ﬁshery experiences constant unit costs.
In an open-access situation, ﬁshermen will enter the ﬁshery when proﬁts are positive
and leave the ﬁshery if proﬁts are negative. Thus, using the open-access condition (2.8),
we obtain the open-access harvest level as an iso-elastic, monotonically increasing function
of stock biomass:
hoa =
( p¯
c
) 1
(e+v)
xχ
(e+1)
(e+v) exp
(
ρ
(e+ 1)
(e+ v)
t
)
≡ a xb exp (c t) . (2.10)
Open-access harvest (2.10) is concave or convex in x depending on the elasticity b of
open-access harvest with respect to the stock size. The size of b depends on the schooling
behavior χ, the demand elasticity 1/ν, and the elasticity of input supply via term e. For
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x ∈ (0,∞), we identify following cases
b T 1 for χ− ν
1− χ S e. (2.11)
For a concave open-access harvest function it must hold that e is suﬃciently large.
As e increases in both, ζ and ψ, this is true for suﬃciently inelastic capital and/or labor
supply. While in open-access ﬁsheries no proﬁts are gained by ﬁshermen (cf. Eq. 2.8),
producer surpluses do exist for e > 0 on account of the non-linear cost structure (cf.
Eq. 2.9).1
Fig. 2.1: Phase diagram and equilibria for the open-access ﬁshery under diﬀerent assump-
tions on the shape of the open-access harvesting function. The green and red
curves depict open access harvest functions for diﬀerent levels of b. The blue curve
sketches a stock growth function. Steady states are depicted as colored dots, where
stability is characterized in the legend.
Using the derived open-access harvest function (2.11) along with the assumptions on
the biomass growth function, we now turn to analyze the resilience of the stylized system
(illustrated in Figure 2.1). Stock growth and harvest are assigned to the vertical, stock size
to the horizontal axes. Intersections of harvest (green and red) and stock growth (blue)
curves represent equilibria of the open-access ﬁshery that may diﬀer in their stability
properties. The eﬀect of the concavity of open access harvest on the resilience is can be
described by the eﬀect on the stability of the equilibrium in the origin:
1 One can easily rewrite equation (2.11) in terms of schooling (χ), resulting in the (well known) result,
that open-access harvest adapts less elastic to changes in stock size, when the targeted ﬁsh species tends
to form dense, stock-independent schools, i.e. if χ is small. When rewriting equation (2.11) in terms
of the inverse elasticity of demand (ν), we ﬁnd that for suﬃciently inelastic demand, the open-access
harvest function is concave. A shock on the ﬁsh stock leads  in case of an inelastic demand function
and thus b < 1  to a less than proportional change in open-access harvest, see equation (2.10).
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• If b > 1, collapse (x = 0) is not an open-access equilibrium.
• If b < 1, collapse (x = 0) is always a stable open-access equilibrium.
By assumption, the slope of the population growth function (blue curve) in the origin is
positive and ﬁnite (cf Eq. (2.1)) The concave open-access harvest functions (dashed green
curves) lie always above the growth function for very small stock sizes. Stock collapse is
therefore always a stable open-access equilibrium.
If the open-access harvest function and the growth function do not intersect, harvest
always exceeds population growth, and the sole equilibrium at x = 0 is stable. If the
open-access harvest function and the growth function intersect, there will be stable/saddle
stable equilibria at positive stock levels x > 0. However, the collapsed stock equilibrium
will remain locally stable. We draw concave harvest functions for several levels of a
that scale the slope of the open access harvest function. Both, increasing prices (p¯) and
increasing technological progress (ρ) shift the concave harvest function upwards, leading
to the disappearance of intersection points, thus, decrease the resilience of the system.
The slope of a convex harvest function (red curve) is always zero at the origin
(h′oa|x=0 = 0). As the slope of the growth function is positive at the origin, the stock
collapse x = 0 always remains unstable.
Economically, the result illustrates that when coastal communities are especially ﬁsh-
ery dependent, that is, if there are few employment alternatives for labor and capital
outside the ﬁshery, and thus the supply functions are inelastic, unregulated harvest will
not adapt suﬃciently to decreasing stock sizes. Harvest quantities will be unsustainable
for small stock sizes (i.e. they lie above stock growth) and the ﬁshery might collapse. Sim-
ilar arguments hold with respect to the elasticity of demand for ﬁsh and the schooling
behavior.
2.3 Empirical Evidence
We do not require detailed information on local capital and/or labor supply, or output
demand to verify the eﬀect of local, ﬁshery-dependent input and output markets on
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the resilience of a marine ecological-economic system. Instead, we employ a two-stage
estimation procedure: The ﬁrst stage includes the estimation of the open-access harvest
function (2.10) for several ﬁsheries to derive information about diﬀerences in the stock
elasticity of open-access harvest b. In the second stage, we feed estimates from the ﬁrst
stage estimation into a regression model that explains the probability of ﬁshery collapse.
2.3.1 First Stage: Open-Access Harvest Function
The estimation of an open-access harvest function (2.10) is based on the assumption that
the ﬁsheries are (at least de facto) unregulated, where management regulations are absent
or ineﬀective.
Fig. 2.2: The introduction of management over time. The ﬁgure depicts the cumulative
share of ﬁsheries managed by TAC or other measures over time in the RAM legacy
database (Ricard et al., 2012).
We employ data on stock biomass and harvest quantity from Ricard et al. (2012),
making use of the static copy of the RAM legacy database.2 It contains time series of
harvest (h) and spawning stock biomass (SSB) estimates from stock assessments for 331
2 Available at http://ramlegacy.marinebiodiversity.ca/ram-legacy-stock-assessment-database/
how-to-access-the-ram-legacy-database (accessed: Sept 2013).
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marine ﬁsh and invertebrate stocks (Ricard et al., 2012). We combine this data with
information on the year Tmgm,i in which management systems have been introduced for
each stock.3 We make use of only data on harvest and SSB when assigned to a year
before Tmgm,i, and when a minimum of 10 observations is available.4 This reduces the
number of ﬁsheries to N = 179.
Figure 2.2 displays the cumulative share of management ﬁsheries in out sample over
time. We observe a steady increase in the share of managed ﬁsheries since the late 1970s.
While by 1990 only about half of the sample ﬁsheries where at least de-facto managed,
this number increases to almost 100% in 2007.
We estimate a logarithmic harvest function assuming log-normally distributed errors,
and, by that, making sure that estimated harvest cannot be negative. The open-access
harvest function is estimated for each ﬁshery i separately using OLS, treating each stock
as independent time series data set:
ln(hi,t) = ln(ai) + bi ln(xi,t) + ci t + i,t ∀ t < Tmgm,i, (2.12)
where i,t are Newey-West standard errors that may be heteroskedastic and possibly
following an AR(1) process.5 We estimate (2.12) using the harvest data for hi,t and SSB
for xit for 179 stocks. A more detailed description of the data and the regression results
can be found in Table 2.2 in Appendix 2.5.2.
Figure 2.3 displays a histogram for estimated stock output elasticities. We ﬁnd 136
positive point estimates for the stock output elasticity bˆ, 73 of them lie below unity.6 We
cannot reject the null hypothesis H0 : b = 1 at a 5% level for only 87 ﬁsheries. This
is strong evidence for the non-linear relationship between unregulated harvest and stock
3 Information on management is compiled from stock status and ﬁshery management reports from the
concerned advisory boards and/or management agencies.
4 Results remain robust with respect to varying the requested number of observations. See Ap-
pendix 2.5.2
5 Endogeneity issues may arise from estimating (2.12) as stock size in period t may depend on harvest
in period t. Robustness checks of the second-stage results with respect to a possible endogeneity of the
regressor in the ﬁrst stage are performed. We use lagged stock size as instrument for stock size and
estimate (2.12) using Instrument Variable (IV) regression. Results remain robust. See Appendix 2.5.4.
6 We also ﬁnd 39 negative stock output elasticities (8 signiﬁcantly negative at a 5% level). Second-stage
results are robust with respect to inclusion or exclusion of these ﬁsheries (see Appendix 2.5.4).
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Fig. 2.3: Histogram of estimated stock elasticities bˆ from OLS estimation. Estimates with
|b| > 5 are excluded in the ﬁgure.
size. Our theory states that the non-linearity stem from a combination of inelastic input
supply, output demand, and the species' schooling behavior.
A 5% signiﬁcant estimate for technological progress is found in 99 ﬁsheries (84 of them
positive). This eﬀect varies considerably between ﬁsheries. We also ﬁnd diﬀerences in the
remaining parameter, aˆ, even for same-species ﬁsheries in nearby geographic area where
technology can be assumed to be quite similar.7
2.3.2 Second Stage: Do Local Markets Inﬂuence Stock Collapse?
In the second stage we verify whether a concave harvest function indeed impairs the
resilience of ﬁsh (or invertebrate) stocks by increasing their probability of collapse.
Classiﬁcations of collapse for ﬁsheries have been proposed by Worm et al. (2006)
and Costello et al. (2008). They are based on the relation of current harvest levels to
former maximum harvest levels. According to these measures, a ﬁshery is considered to
be collapsed when the harvest level falls below a certain percentage (typically 10%-1%)
of a previous maximum. It has, however, been stated that solely harvest based measures
7 For more details on the ﬁrst stage regression see Table 2.2 in Appendix 2.5.2.
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may be misleading as landings data alone will not adequately reﬂect changes in ﬁsh
populations and communities .
Here, we employ a modiﬁcation of the collapse indicators by applying similar criteria
to the stock sizes. The reason is that we want to explain that the stock may have collapsed
because of a particular shape of the open-access harvesting function. When analyzing the
stock eﬀect on open-access harvest, as we do here, a solely harvest based approach may
be misleading. One would suspect that in case of a convex open-access harvest function,
harvest levels react strongly to changes in biomass, leading to a well-deﬁned harvest based
indicator for collapsed ﬁsh stocks. For concave functions, however, harvest reacts less
drastically to changes in biomass, somehow diminishing the explanatory power of harvest
based indicators. As Figure 2.3 shows the stock elasticity of open-access harvest varies
considerably. We thus conclude that pure harvest based indicators for stock collapses
are not suitable for our approach. We therefore apply the proposed indicators to actual
stock size x (measured in SSB) instead of harvest. Additionally, we are not interested
whether a stock can be categorized as collapsed only in a speciﬁc year but if it has been
categorized as collapsed until the year T . By that we include the possibility of recovery
through changes in the ecosystem. The applied indicator of collapseDi,Tcoll,i,y% thus states
whether a stock i can be classiﬁed as being collapsed until time Tcoll,i:
Di,Tcoll,i,y% =

1 if any xt ≤ y/100 · xs,max; s < t ≤ Tcoll,i
0 else,
where y denotes the chosen percentage level, and xs,max the maximum observed stock
level before time t. Figure 2.4 displays the share of collapsed ﬁsheries in our sample
using this indicator. For the calculation of the share we use the total number of ﬁsheries
N = 179. The dashed curve, however, depicts the total number of ﬁsheries in sample
at any given point in time. All 179 ﬁsheries of the sample are only jointly observed
in the period between 1980 and 2000. Using diﬀerent indicator levels y naturally leads
to diﬀerences in the classiﬁcation. A 10% indicator eventually leads to a more than
20% share of collapsed ﬁsheries by 2010, while the more conservative 3-6% indicators
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Fig. 2.4: Collapsed stocks in the sample. On the left side the ﬁgure depict the share of stock
in the sample that can be considered collapsed for a year using the indicator below.
The 10% and 5% indicators are highlighted. The axis on the right side the ﬁgure
- corresponding to the dashed line - indicates how many stocks are observable for
a given year in the sample.
yield in a share below 10%. In the following, we restrict the analysis to a 'lax' 10%, a
conservative 5% indicator for collapse. To guarantee the connection between open access
harvest and collapse we restrict the time of collapse to the start of the management year
Tcoll,i = Tmgm,i. 8
To determine the inﬂuence of a concave open-access harvest function on the probability
of a collapse, we are not interested in the inﬂuence of the exact value of the estimated
parameter bˆ, but in the information whether it is smaller or larger than unity. An shock
on either stock size, stock growth or harvest may lead to a ﬁshery collapse if the harvest
function is concave, but not if it is convex (given the ﬁsh stock is not characterized by a
minimum viable population level). We thus generate a dummy variable, Db<1 that takes
8 Results are robust with respect to other values of Tcoll. Signiﬁcance decreases only when using a
lag between the year of the introduction of management and the year of collapse of more than 15. See
Appendix 2.5.3 and 2.5.4.
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the value one if the estimated stock elasticity bˆi lies below unity:9
Db<1 =

1 if bˆi < 1
0 else.
We treat each stock as a separate cross-sectional unit, and employ a probit model to
estimate the probability of a collapse:
P (Dcollapse = 1) = Φ(X
′β + Z ′α), (2.13)
with Dcollapse ∈ {D10%, D5%},
where X are economic factors inﬂuencing the harvest function and Z ecological factors
inﬂuencing the stock growth. Among the economic factors we add the dummy for con-
cavity of the harvest function Db<1 as well as the estimated intercept (ln aˆi), and the
estimated trend parameter (cˆi). Both ln a and c inﬂuence the steepness of the open-
access harvest function (2.10): ln aˆ includes information on the output price level while
the trend parameter is proportional to the rate of technological progress.10 Our model
states that the increase in the output price level and in technological progress increases
the probability of collapse (see Figure 2.1).
Ecological factors and shocks (Z) that cause changes in biomass growth are in-
disputably important reasons for regime shifts in marine ecosystems. Modeling these
changes, however, goes beyond the scope of this study. We furthermore assume that
these ecological factors are independent from the utilized economic factors that shape
open access harvest (X ⊥ Z). A changing climate variable, for example, will shock the
system independently of the shape of the harvest function.
Wooldridge (2002) demonstrates that unobserved heterogeneity caused by omitting
independent variables from a probit model will bias the estimated regression coeﬃcients
9 The 39 estimated bˆi that lie insigniﬁcantly below zero are included in that classiﬁcation. The 8
estimated elasticities that lie signiﬁcantly below zero are included as well. A robustness test with respect
to the exclusion of these estimates is performed, and results remain robust. See Appendix 2.5.4.
10 It has previously been suggested that technical progress may increase harvesting pressure and hasten
ﬁsheries collapse (Squires and Vestergaard, 2013).
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but does not aﬀect the average marginal eﬀect. Cramer (2003) suggests that same is
true for logit models. However, the signiﬁcance of estimates might be biased downwards
(Ramalho and Ramalho, 2010). We thereby conclude that omitting ecological factors
from equation (2.13) will still yield in consistent estimates on the average marginal eﬀect
of a concave harvest function on the probability of ﬁshery collapse.11
Results from the second-stage regression (2.13) are listed in Table 2.1 for the two
collapse indicators and with economic control variables only.12
P (D5% = 1) P (D10% = 1)
Coef./s.e. M.E./s.e. Coef./s.e. M.E./s.e.
Db<1 0.938*** 0.048*** 0.695* 0.138*
0.32 0.01 0.41 0.06
ln aˆ -0.020* -0.001* -0.016 -0.004
0.01 0 0.01 0
cˆ 0.789 0.047 1.411 0.313
1.15 0.07 1.11 0.24
Constant -2.625*** -1.625***
0.27 0.36
lnL -25.03 -72.965
χ2 9.312 4.193
p-value 0.025 0.241
N. of replications 650 1000
N 179 179
1st stage OLS, 2nd stage Probit with bootstrapped standard errors,
Tcollapse,i = Tmgm,i, Signiﬁcance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Tab. 2.1: Second stage regression results for two collapse indicatiors (10% right and 5% left).
Next to the coeﬃcients (Coef.) the corresponding average marginal eﬀects (M.E.)
are listed.
The overall signiﬁcance of all regressions (p-value) is satisfactory for the conservative
but not the 'lax' indicator. The parameter of interest (Db<0) is positive in both regressions
and signiﬁcant at a 1% level for the conservative and at a 10% level for the lax indicator.
11 We additionally attempt to instrument ecological factors by including characteristics of ﬁsh species
(habitual area) and a regional dummy Dnorth that equals one if the stock occupies the northern hemi-
sphere. This large scale regional eﬀect may control for an ecosystem eﬀect such as the observed regime
shifts in several ecosystems. However, results remain quite robust and almost all estimated ecological
parameters remain insigniﬁcant. See Appendix 2.5.4 for more details on the regressions.
12 We use bootstrapped standard errors to account for the Error-in-Variables (EIV) issue created by
using the generated regressor Db<1 in the estimation (Efron and Tibshirani, 1994; Matei and Meer,
2000). The number of bootstrap replications is given below estimates.
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However, we cannot directly interpret the coeﬃcients. Corresponding average marginal
eﬀects are listed next to the estimated coeﬃcients. A concave open access harvest function
thereby leads to a signiﬁcant increase in probability of ﬁshery collapse of 4.8%-13.8%
depending on the employed indicator. The less-than-proportional adaptation of harvest
to changes in stock size is thus clearly a risk factor concerning the collapse of ﬁsheries.
The result for the 5% indicator is remarkably robust with respect to changes in control
variables, regression methods, changes in Tcoll, and the number of observations we use
(see Appendix 2.5.4).
The marginal eﬀects of the economic controls ln a and c remain mostly insigniﬁcant
for both regressions. For the 5% indicator we ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of the slope ln a that
is signiﬁcant at a 10% level. However, the marginal eﬀect is quite small. Caused by
the complex composition of the term a (see equation (2.11)) we are not able to interpret
the average marginal eﬀect of ln a. Term c, however, is proportional to the rate of
technological progress (ρ): an increase in technological progress by one percent point
does not signiﬁcantly change the probability of collapse.
Using a global data set and diﬀerent indicators for ﬁshery collapse, we ﬁnd clear
empirical evidence for our thesis that local input and output markets (that is suﬃciently
inelastic factor supply and output demand) as well as increasing schooling behavior of
stocks decreases the resilience of an unregulated ﬁshery. The probability of stock collapse
positively depends on the the concavity of the open access harvest function. Results are
mostly signiﬁcant at least at a 1% level for a conservative 5% indicator, and quite robust
with respect to changes in estimation method, time frame and other variations.
2.4 Discussion
In this paper we investigated the economic conditions under which an unregulated ex-
ploitation of a marine ecosystem is prone to collapse. We develop a theoretical model
of an open-access ﬁshery with two input markets for capital and labor, and one output
market for the harvested product, and derive conditions for the existence of one or more
open-access equilibria. Our results show that an unregulated ﬁshery is particularly vul-
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nerable to collapse if the supply elasticities for labor and capital are low, if the demand
elasticity for ﬁsh is low, and if the ﬁsh species tends to form schools.
While the latter result is well known in the theoretical literature (Clark, 1990), the
eﬀects of input and output market structure on the resilience of a ﬁshery have not yet
been analyzed in such a formal setting. Bjørndal et al. (1993) suggested that in ﬁsheries,
capital with few employment alternatives as well as low opportunity costs of labor, that
is, few outside options for ﬁshermen, may lead to overexploitation and possible extinction.
In our model these eﬀects are formally linked to the open access harvest function via the
non-linearity of the cost function. Producer surpluses gained from employing production
factors lessen the adaptation of open-access harvest quantity to changes in stock size.
Thus, the existence of local input markets leads to a decrease in stock elasticity of
open-access harvest, and, by that, unsustainably high harvest levels especially for small
stock sizes.
On the consumer side, we allow demand to be less than perfectly elastic. Given ﬁsh
stocks decrease and supply for ﬁsh shifts down, the increasing equilibrium price level for
ﬁsh may lead to only an insuﬃcient adaptation of harvested quantity to the falling stock
sizes. Again, this eﬀect on it's own  given the demand function is suﬃciently inelastic 
may lead to unsustainable harvest levels and possible collapse.
Clearly other factors, in particular natural and environmental events, are likely to
also play a part in the collapse of ﬁsh stocks. Our theoretical model is highly stylized.
We abstract from any species as well as industry interactions to allow for an analytical
identiﬁcation of certain market eﬀects. Clearly in ﬁsheries, biological interactions between
species do exist and will inﬂuence the resilience of ﬁsheries. Since we only impose very
few assumptions on the biological part of the model, interactions between species would
not lead to diﬀerent results.
We test our theoretical results using a global data set of ﬁsheries (Ricard et al., 2012).
We use a classiﬁcation for stock collapse that is based on the well known harvest-based
indicator by Worm et al. (2006) and Costello et al. (2008) but applied to stock size instead
of harvest. While we do not ﬁnd support for technological progress aﬀecting species
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collapse, we do ﬁnd that an open access harvest function that is inelastic with respect to
stock size increases the probability of a ﬁsh stock collapse. We also show that the stock
elasticity of open access harvest varies strongly between ﬁsheries  and vary considerably
from previous estimated schooling eﬀects  indicating that diﬀerences in output and input
markets indeed shape open access harvest. The resilience of marine ﬁsheries thus seems
indeed to be dependent on local economic conditions in ﬁshing communities.
Our analysis is focused on unregulated ﬁsheries  a type of management system that
oﬃcially seems to become extinct in recent years. However, there are still many de-facto
open-access ﬁsheries around the globe, not only in the developing world but also within
the regulated EU ﬁsheries (Quaas et al., 2012).
Our empirical sample is mostly drawn from developed countries as there is no system-
atic database for harvest and stock levels for ﬁsh stocks in the developing world. However,
management eﬀectiveness, especially concerning the implementation and enforcement of
regulations, seems to be lower in low-income than in high-income counties (Mora et al.,
2009). Development countries additionally seem to be more at risk from illegal and un-
regulated ﬁshing (Agnew et al., 2009). Thus, it seems that many ﬁsheries, especially in
the developing world are at least de-facto open access to date. Our theoretical model as
well as the historical correlation drawn from mostly high income countries in our sample,
may serve as an indicator on how de-facto unregulated ﬁsheries in the developing world
today are at risk of collapse depending on local labor, capital markets and markets for
ﬁsh produce. Additionally, the eﬀect of climate change on marine ecosystems will most
likely not vanish, adding to the necessity of understanding marine ecological-economic
systems and their vulnerability to collapse.
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2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 The Market Equilibrium Cost Function
Using w to denote the wage rate and r to denote the rental rate for capital, the repre-
sentative ﬁrm's cost minimization problem
min
l,k
wl + rk
s.t. Eqs.(2.3), (2.4)
yields the factor demand functions
l =
h
q xχ exp(ρ t)
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
r
w
)1−ϕ
(2.14)
k =
h
q xχ exp(ρ t)
(
1− ϕ
ϕ
w
r
)ϕ
(2.15)
and a cost function that is linear in harvest, given by (2.7). In labor and capital market
equilibrium, we ﬁnd (using (2.14) in (2.5), (2.15) in (2.6) respectively)
w = ω lζ = ω
(
h
q xχ exp(ρ t)
)ζ (
ϕ
1− ϕ
r
w
)ζ (1−ϕ)
, (2.16)
r = κ kψ = κ
(
h
q xχ exp(ρ t)
)ψ (
1− ϕ
ϕ
w
r
)ψ ϕ
. (2.17)
With (2.16) in (2.17) ( (2.17) in (2.16) respectively) we derive the equilibrium wage and
capital rental rate
weq =
(
ω1+ψ ϕ
(
h
q xχ exp(ρ t)
)ζ (1+ψ) (
κϕ
1− ϕ
)ζ (1−ϕ)) 11+ψ ϕ+ζ (1−ϕ)
, (2.18)
req =
(
κ1+ζ (1−ϕ)
(
h
q xχ exp(ρ t)
)ψ (1+ζ) (
ω (1− ϕ)
ϕ
)ψ ϕ) 11+ψ ϕ+ζ (1−ϕ)
. (2.19)
Substituting (2.18) and (2.19) in (2.7), we obtain the equilibrium cost function
C(h, x) = C he+1 x−χ(e+1)e−ρ (e+1) t,
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with
C = q−(e+1)
(
ω
ϕ
) ϕ (1+ψ)
1+ψ ϕ+ζ (1−ϕ)
(
κ
1− ϕ
) (1−ϕ) (1+ζ)
1+ψ ϕ+ζ (1−ϕ)
, (2.20)
and the "local" market term
e = ζ
ϕ(1 + ψ)
1 + ζ(1− ϕ) + ψϕ + ψ
(1− ϕ)(1 + ζ)
1 + ζ(1− ϕ) + ψϕ. (2.21)
The local market term e increases in both, ζ and φ.
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2.5.2 First Stage Regression Results and Data Summary
Table 2.2 summarizes the employed data set as well as some results from the 1st stage
regression of the open access harvest function. The data set consists of 179 ﬁsheries in
10 regions, the majority of them in the Paciﬁc and Atlantic ocean. The minimal number
Number of stocks in sample N = 179
Number of observations for
1st stage regression T¯ = 32
Tmin = 10
Tmax = 107
Regions in sample:
Atlantic Ocean (49), Arctic Ocean (5), Paciﬁc Ocean (79), Indian Ocean (2),
Antarctic Ocean (2), Bering Sea (11), North Sea (11), Baltic Sea (7)
Gulf of Mexico (3), South Africa (10)
1st stage Regression (OLS)
Stock elasticity b b¯ = 0.805
Stock elasticity b b ∈ (0, 1) 736 cases
b < 0 40 cases
b∗∗ < 0 8 cases
Time trend c b¯ = 0.047
c > 0 129 cases
c∗∗ > 0 85 cases
Constant ln a ¯ln a = -1.624
Stocks with b ∗ ∗ < 0:
Arrowtooth ﬂounder , Gulf of Alaska (Tmgm = 1990)
Dusky rockﬁsh , Gulf of Alaska (Tmgm = 1988)
School whiting, Southeast Australia (Tmgm = 1992)
Albacore tuna, Northern Atlantic (Tmgm = 2001)
Longspine thornyhead, Paciﬁc Coast (Tmgm = 1991)
Paciﬁc hake, Paciﬁc Coast (Tmgm = 1999)
Gopher rockﬁsh, Southern Paciﬁc Coast (Tmgm = 1982)
Mackerel, ICES IIa-IIIabd-IV-Vb-VI-VII-VIIIabcde-XII-XIV-Ixa (Tmgm = 1987)
Tab. 2.2: Data summary and 1st stage regression results. The top part of the table contains
information on the utilized data set including the number of observations and the
covered regions. The second part summarizes estimated parameters b, c, and ln a.
The bottom part list all cases where the stock elasticity of open access harvest lies
signiﬁcantly (5% level) below zero.
of observations used for the 1st stage OLS regression is 10, the mean number 32. A
Hausman test for exogeneity of the regressor xt is performed for all regressions. The H0
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of exogeneity is rejected for 75 regressions. Robustness checks of second stage results with
respect to using IV regressions in the ﬁrst stage are performed and listed in Table 2.4
in 2.5.4.
2.5.3 Diﬀerent Collapse Indicators
(Tcoll − Tmgm)
# 0 5 4 15
In
di
ca
to
r
1% 1 1 1 2
2% 4 4 5 5
3% 6 6 7 10
4% 6 6 7 11
5% 6 8 9 12
6% 6 8 9 14
7% 9 17 19 23
8% 14 22 25 26
9% 19 25 29 30
10% 27 31 35 36
Tab. 2.3: Variation in the collapse indicators. This table lists the number of 'collapsed'
stocks in the sample when employing the x% indicator regarding a collapse that
happened within (Tcoll − Tmgm) years after management was introduced.
Table 2.3 lists the number of collapsed stocks for diﬀerent levels y for the index of
collapse (2.13), and diﬀerent levels of Tcoll−Tmgm, i.e. the maximum distance between the
introduction of management measures and the ﬁsheries collapse. Medium level indicators
(3%-6%) yield in very similar results. For most indicators the number of collapses almost
doubles when increasing the distance from 0 years to 15 years. This may indicate that
introduced management measures are not very eﬀective especially in the ﬁrst years after
introduction.
2.5.4 Second Stage Robustness Checks
Table 2.4 lists results using IV instead of OLS estimates in the ﬁrst-stage regression.
Estimated parameters remain positive and robust in magnitude and signiﬁcance for the
5% indicator, but decrease both for the 10% indicator.
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P (D5% = 1) P (D10% = 1)
Coef./s.e. M.E./s.e. Coef./s.e. M.E./s.e.
Db<1 0.792*** 0.049*** 0.234 0.054
0.27 0.02 0.27 0.06
ln aˆ -0.004 0 0 0
0.01 0 0 0
cˆ 0.162 0.009 0.165 0.038
0.5 0.03 0.51 0.12
Constant -2.383*** -1.166***
0.18 0.17
lnL -24.661 -75.289
χ2 9.933 0.907
p-value 0.019 0.824
N. of replica-
tions
650 1000
N 179 179
1st stage IV, 2nd stage Probit with bootstrapped standard errors,
Tcollapse,i = Tmgm,i, Signiﬁcance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Tab. 2.4: Robustness check: First stage IV regressions for two collapse indicatiors (10%
right and 5% left). Next to the coeﬃcients (Coef.) the corresponding average
marginal eﬀects (M.E.) are listed.
Table 2.5 summarizes results for the regression where stocks are excluded when
the stock elasticity lies signiﬁcantly below zero (ﬁrst regression), and regressions using
diﬀerent control variables.
The second listed regression attempts to instrument ecological eﬀects (Z)by using a
dummy for northern hemisphereDnorth, where ecosystem regime shifts have been observed
in the 1990s. The third regression attempts to control for a management eﬀect, that is a
dummy that equals one if the ﬁsh stock is managed and ﬁshed multilaterally. We do not
ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects for both control variables. The eﬀect of a concave harvest on the
probability of collapse remains robust.
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P (D5% = 1) Excl. bˆ ∗ ∗ < 0 Incl. Dnorth Inc. Dmultimgm
Coef./s.e. M.E./s.e. Coef./s.e. M.E./s.e. Coef./s.e. M.E./s.e.
Db<1 0.941*** 0.052*** 0.961*** 0.047*** 0.854*** 0.043***
0.29 0.01 0.3 0.01 0.31 0.01
ln aˆ -0.019* -0.001* -0.021* -0.001* -0.017 -0.001
0.01 0 0.01 0 0.01 0
cˆ 0.777 0.049 0.967 0.056 0.625 0.037
1.09 0.07 1.3 0.07 1.24 0.07
Dnorth 0.298 0.015
0.29 0.01
Dmultimgm 0.467 0.042
0.35 0.04
Constant -2.603*** -2.886*** -2.588***
0.25 0.32 0.28
lnL -24.767 -24.829 -24.75
χ2 10.945 12.928 10.096
p-value 0.012 0.012 0.039
N. of replica-
tions
676 430 430
N 171 179 179
1st stage OLS, 2nd stage Probit with bootstrapped standard errors,
Tcollapse,i = Tmgm,i, Signiﬁcance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Tab. 2.5: Robustness check: Control variables
Table 2.6 summarizes results changing the relevant time frame of species collapse
(Tcoll − Tmgm). Increasing the lag between the introduction of managements and the
species collapse does not have a large eﬀect on magnitude and signiﬁcance of the average
marginal eﬀect for up to 10 years. An increase to Tcoll − Tmgm = 15 however yields in a
decrease of signiﬁcance of all eﬀects. This eﬀect is suspected as more and more ﬁsheries
moved towards an eﬀective management over time.
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P (D5% = 1) Tcoll,i = Tmgm,i + 5 Tcoll,i = Tmgm,i + 10 Tcoll,i = Tmgm,i + 15
Coef./s.e. M.E./s.e. Coef./s.e. M.E./s.e. Coef./s.e. M.E./s.e.
Db<1 1.342*** 0.074*** 1.478*** 0.086*** 0.942 0.089
0.45 0.01 0.45 0.01 0.62 0.04
ln aˆ -0.027** -0.002** -0.029** -0.002** -0.017 -0.002
0.01 0 0.01 0 0.01 0
cˆ 1.255 0.082 1.311 0.091 1.347 0.150
1.28 0.08 1.36 0.09 1.52 0.15
Constant -2.87*** -2.938*** -2.298***
0.44 0.44 0.59
lnL -30.184 -32.618 -41.694
χ2 9.241 11.161 2.358
p-value 0.026 0.011 0.501
N. of replica-
tions
685 678 886
N 179 179 179
1st stage OLS, 2nd stage Probit with bootstrapped standard errors,
Tcollapse,i = Tmgm,i, Signiﬁcance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Tab. 2.6: Robustness check: Varying Tcoll
Table 2.7 summarizes changing the minimum number of observations used in the 1st
stage regression. We vary the number between 5 and 15. Again, the magnitude remains
robust, while the signiﬁcance decreases for both levels.
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P (D5% = 1) ≥ 5 obs. In 1st stage ≥ 15 obs. In 1st stage
Coef./s.e. M.E./s.e. Coef./s.e. M.E./s.e.
Db<1 0.609* 0.03* 0.766** 0.047
0.32 0.01 0.31 0.01
ln aˆ -0.009 -0.001 -0.04* -0.003
0.01 0 0.02 0
cˆ -0.077 -0.004 -2.635 -0.193
0.64 0.04 2.19 0.15
Constant -2.377*** -2.266***
0.25 0.28
lnL -26.42 -22.909
χ2 3.848 6.939
p-value 0.278 0.074
N. of replica-
tions
662 660
N 212 131
1st stage OLS, 2nd stage Probit with bootstrapped standard errors,
Signiﬁcance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Tab. 2.7: Robustness check: Number of observations
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3.1 Introduction
Natural systems may be characterized by limited resilience and the possibility of regime
shifts as a consequence of exogenous shocks as well as internal forces (Scheﬀer et al.,
2001). The ecological literature typically considers regime shifts to be undesirable or
even catastrophic (Scheﬀer et al., 2001; Scheﬀer and Carpenter, 2003). Put the other
way around, strengthening resilience of natural systems is perceived to be a precondition
for sustainability (Arrow et al., 1995; Levin et al., 1998; Perrings, 2006).
We understand regime shifts as drastic changes in the composition of marine ecosys-
tems over a large time and space scale. In the Baltic sea two major regime shifts con-
cerning local ﬁsheries have been identiﬁed. One shift from seal to cod domination due to
the virtual elimination of marine mammals in the Baltic, and another from cod to sprat
domination in the late 1980s. The latter regime shifts has been explained by overﬁshing
and climate change and accompanied by additional food-web changes (Österblom et al.,
2007; Moellmann et al., 2009; Lindegren et al., 2009).
In this paper, we study an ecological-economic ﬁshery model and investigate the eco-
nomic consequences of regime shifts, such as observed in the late 1980s for the Baltic
sea, to which we apply our model. We consider an open access ﬁshery, and analyze the
distributional implications of a regime shift, i.e. the distribution of beneﬁts for diﬀer-
ent functional interest groups using the ecosystem, and looking at situations with and,
hypothetically, without a regime shift. The regime shift is triggered by an exogenous
shock on the predator population dynamics, with internal economic processes playing an
important role for the (in-)stability of the coupled ecological-economic system. We con-
sider an imperfectly elastic demand for landed ﬁsh and a non-linear ﬁshing cost function,
which may be due to imperfectly elastic supply of production factors employed in the
ﬁshery in a similar fashion than in chapter 2 of this thesis (Fricke and Quaas, 2015a).
These non-linearities inﬂuence the shape of the relationship between open access harvest
and the current stock size and, by that, aﬀect the resilience of the open-access ﬁshery.
The non-linearity of the cost function allows for positive factor rents in an unregulated
ﬁshery even if proﬁts are zero. We show that, under the assumptions of iso-elastic cost
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and demand functions, factor surplus and consumer surplus vary with the stock size in
a parallel fashion. Thus, for an individual ﬁshery, factor owners are positively aﬀected
by a regime shift if and only if consumers gain from the regime shift. In a multi-species
setting, however, as present in the Baltic cod, herring, and sprat ﬁsheries, a regime shift
may aﬀect the stakeholders in the ﬁsheries diﬀerently.
To study these eﬀects quantitatively, we apply our model to the Baltic sea sprat,
herring and cod ﬁsheries. We investigate the surpluses generated in the Baltic ﬁsheries for
the various functional interest groups and analyze how they are aﬀected by the ecosystem
regime shift. The parametrization of the cost and demand functions are empirically highly
uncertain. We take this uncertainty into account by conducting a thorough Monte-Carlo
sensitivity analysis of the model. We ﬁnd that the stakeholders in the cod and herring
ﬁsheries most likely have incurred a loss from the regime shift. For the herring ﬁshery the
loss depends on whether or not the regime shift triggered a stock collapse, which depends
on the exact economic parameters. The stakeholders in the sprat ﬁshery, by contrast,
most likely have beneﬁted from the regime shift, but the magnitude of the beneﬁt is much
lower than the loss incurred by the two other ﬁsheries.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we develop our ecological-
economic model and derive analytical results. In section 3, we present the quantitative
results for the Baltic sea. The ﬁnal section brieﬂy concludes.
3.2 A Coupled Ecologic-Economic Model
In the following, we sketch the coupled ecological-economic model starting with the eco-
logical part. Population dynamics are modeled as a biomass model that is based on
logistic growth and possible interactions that enter the dynamics linearly, as previously
used for ﬁsheries (Flaaten, 1991; Brown et al., 2005) and grazing systems (Walker et al.,
1981). The growth function of a ﬁsh stock x is furthermore speciﬁed as:
g(x) = r x
(
1− x
K
)
+ µx y, (3.1)
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where x ≥ 0 the species biomass, r > 0 is the intrinsic growth rate, K > 0 the capacity
limit, and h ≥ 0 the harvest rate. The interaction parameter µ may be positive or
negative, depending on the speciﬁcation of the triggering variable y.1
We thus think of y as a place holder for either predator, prey, competition or another
exogenous eﬀect such as climate change.
In our model interactions between ﬁsheries only exist on the ecological side. Costs,
harvest, input and output markets are assumed to be independent for the diﬀerent ﬁsh-
eries. In the following we set up the economic part of the model without writing an index
for the particular species to the cost and demand functions. All parameters are conceived
to diﬀer with the ﬁsh species under considerations.
Harvesting is described by the generalized Gordon-Schaefer production function,
h = q E xχ, (3.2)
where q > 0 denotes the productivity parameter, and χ > 0 the stock-output elasticity,
sometimes referred to as `schooling' parameter. In the Gordon-Schaefer framework, which
assumes χ = 1, q is the `catchability' coeﬃcient. Fishing eﬀort E can be though of as an
intermediate product that itself is produced by means of labor l and capital k according
to some production function (Hannesson, 1983a; Squires, 1987).
Fishermen are assumed to minimize their costs to determine their optimal harvest
quantity in each period. Cost minimization gives rise to factor demand for labor and
capital employed in the ﬁshery. If the supply of these factors is imperfectly elastic, their
price in factor market equilibrium, and thus marginal ﬁshing cost, will increase with
harvest quantity. Similarly, if the eﬀort production function exhibits decreasing returns
to scale, marginal ﬁshing costs will be increasing with catch. We thus assume a harvesting
1 The variable y may stand for the stock size of a competing, predator, or prey species. For the
predator-prey case, the interaction term that is both linear in prey and predator biomass, reﬂects the
assumption that predator and prey randomly move in a homogeneous environment and the predator's
success rate when meeting a prey is µ. An increase in predator biomass decreases both the growth rate
for a given biomass level and the maximal achievable biomass level of the prey by shifting the growth
function down.
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cost function of the following iso-elastic type
c(h, x) = c
(
h
xχ
)e+1
, (3.3)
with c > 0, and e ≥ 0. A potential non-linearity in the cost function is modeled by
the parameter e ≥ 0. It equals zero if all input factor supplies are perfectly elastic,
and if the eﬀort production function exhibits constant returns to scale. If any of the
production factors is imperfectly elastic in supply, or if the eﬀort production function
exhibits decreasing returns to scale, marginal ﬁshing costs will increase with the catch,
e > 0. We show in Appendix 3.5.1 how the cost function (3.3) could be derived from
assumptions on the inverse supply functions of labor and capital, and a Cobb-Douglas
eﬀort production function.
It may be safe to assume perfectly elastic demand for output of a ﬁshery in some
cases, for example a small cod or haddock ﬁshery selling ﬁsh on a large world market
for white ﬁsh. However, many ﬁsheries either serve local markets, focus on species with
no close substitutes, or are suﬃciently large to aﬀect the world price. We assume an
iso-elastic inverse demand function,
p(h) = p¯ h−ν ; , (3.4)
for the harvest, where 0 ≤ ν < 1 is the inverse price elasticity of demand. The restriction
ν < 1 means that revenues p h will increase with harvest.
3.2.1 The Open Access Fishery
In an open access situation, ﬁshermen will enter the ﬁshery when proﬁts are positive and
leave the ﬁshery if proﬁts are negative. Thus, using the zero proﬁt condition, p(h)h =
c(h, x), with Eq. (3.3) and Eq. (3.4) , we obtain the open access harvest function,
hoa = a x
b, with a =
( p¯
c
) 1
(e+v)
, and b = χ
(e+ 1)
(e+ v)
(3.5)
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Open access harvest (3.5) is concave or convex in x depending on the size of the term b.
The stock elasticity of open access harvest b depends on the schooling behavior χ, the
demand elasticity 1/ν, and the input market conditions via term e. For a concave open
access harvest function it must hold that e is suﬃciently large. We show this in more
detail in Appendix 3.5.1.
Figure 3.1 illustrates how both, the limited resilience in an ecosystem changes (by
a change in µy), and the limited resilience in an economic system (imperfectly elastic
labor and capital supply) may lead to the collapse of the open access predator ﬁshery.
Population dynamics are drawn for two levels of µy (the green and red curves). Three
diﬀerent harvest functions are drawn for the concave (Figure (3.1a, numbering (1)-(3)),
and one for the convex (Figure (3.1b)) case. Filled circles indicate stable, empty circles
unstable, and dashed circles saddle stable equilibria.
By assumption (cf. Eq. (3.1) ﬀ), the population growth function is ﬁnite and positive
at the origin. The concave open-access harvest function (as in panel (a)) thus lies always
above the growth function for very small stock sizes. Stock collapse (x = 0) is a locally
stable open access equilibrium in this case. If the open-access harvest function and the
growth function do not intersect, harvest always exceeds population growth, and the
equilibrium at x = 0 is globally stable.
The slope of a convex harvest function in Figure (3.1(b)) on the other hand is always
zero in the origin. For very small stock levels, the growth function lies always above open
access harvest. Stock collapse is therefore always unstable and there is only one unique
stable open access equilibrium at a positive stock level.
We can use this result for the stock elasticity of open access harvest along with the
population dynamic from Eq. (3.1) to make statements about the resilience of the system:
Proposition 1. If b < 1, collapse (x = 0) is always a stable open access equilibrium. If
b > 1, collapse (x = 0) is no open access equilibrium.
The concavity of the open access harvest function depends on the characteristics of
input supply functions. Thus, if the schooling parameter lies between zero and unity
and capital and/or labor are suﬃciently inelastic, the resilience of the marine ecological-
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Fig. 3.1: Illustration of potential regime shifts in a ﬁshery. Both ﬁgures depict possible
growth functions (in green and red), open access harvest functions (in blue), and
steady states including their stability characteristics. The top panel illustrates
diﬀerent formations of concave open access functions (1)-(3).
economic system is reduced, i.e. stock collapse is always a stable open access equilibrium.
The economic idea behind this mathematical result is not new. Bjørndal et al. (1993)
already discus that long-lived capital with few or now alternative employment oppor-
tunities is more likely to lead to serious overexploitation or even stock extinction than
short-lived, mobile capital (Bjørndal et al., 1993, p 161). A similar line of reasoning ap-
plies for labor as ﬁsheries are often seasonal, and employment alternatives for ﬁshermen
may be very limited.
We can further determine the tipping point of an open access ﬁshery depending on
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the size of µy in the population dynamics (3.1) corresponding to the curve (2) in Figure
(3.1(a)).
Proposition 2. Deﬁne
Θ =
K (r(b− 1) + µy(b− 1))
r(b− 2) . (3.6)
Collapse is globally stable if
µy < µ¯y ≡ abΘ(b−1) − r(1− 2Θ
K
) (3.7)
Proof. See Appendix 3.5.2.
Is the interaction eﬀect smaller than a certain value µ¯y the maximum achievable net
population growth lies below zero. In this case the population inevitably collapses.
Rents
The non-linear cost structure allows for a positive factor rents in the open access regime
even if there are no proﬁts. These factor rents comprise worker surplus, capital owner
surplus, and proﬁts in eﬀort production. We interpret the sum of these rents as ﬁsher-
man's surplus (FS). It be calculated as the area between the marginal cost curve and the
horizontal line at the open access price level,
FS =
e
1 + e
c
(
hoa
xχ
)1+e
(3.8)
For the proof see Appendix 3.5.3.
The open access consumers surplus can be derived as the area between inverse demand
and the horizontal line at the open access price level,
CS =
∫ hoa
0
p(h) dh− p(hoa) hoa (3.9)
=
ν
1− ν p¯h
1−ν
oa .
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Proposition 3. For given parameter values e, c, χ, ν, and p¯, FS and CS change pro-
portional to each other over time, FS ∝ CS.
Proof. This is because hoa ∝ xb, with b given by (3.5). Thus,
FS =
e c a1+e
1 + e
x(b−χ) (e+1) =
e c a1+e
1 + e
x(1−ν)χ
e+1
e+ν
=
e c a1+e
1 + e
x(1−ν) b =
e c ae+ν
1 + e
h1−νoa =
e p¯
1 + e
h1−νoa =
e (1− ν)
(1 + e) ν
CS.
Since both, consumers and factor owners are aﬀected proportionally, changes of stock
size or harvest level lead to no trade-oﬀs within a single ﬁshery. When ecological interac-
tions exist, however, trade-oﬀs between consumers and factor owners of diﬀerent ﬁsheries
may occur.
3.3 The Baltic Sea System
The Baltic Sea is a brackish semi-enclosed sea that is relatively poor in ﬁsh species. It's
commercial ﬁshery is mainly dominated by cod, with catches in 2012 of around 80 000 t,
sprat (190 000 t), and herring (200 000 t). And landed values of around 80 mioe for cod,
60 mioe for herring, and more than 40 mioe for sprat (STECF, 2013, p 233 ﬀ). Cod
landings peaked in the late 1970s/early 1980s to around 400 000 tonnes followed by a
swift decline in spite of high eﬀort levels (ICES, 2013c). Simultaneously catches of sprat
increased substantially in the 1980s and 1990s.
Cod, sprat and herring in the Baltic sea do not exist independently of each other.
Suggested interactions include cod predation on both, sprat and herring, while the two
prey species themselves prey on cod eggs and larvae and impose food competition for each
other, and young cod. Zooplankton abundance may also aﬀect stock size (Lindegren
et al., 2009). Since the early 1980s cod biomass decreased, while the development of
sprat biomass seemed to be positively aﬀected by the decreasing cod stocks. Herring
biomass steadily decreased from the 1970s until 2000. Moellmann et al. (2009) identify
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two stable ecosystem states between the 1970s and the 2000s separated by a transition
period between 1888 and 1993. Main forces behind the shift from a cod dominated
towards a sprat dominated state in the late 1980s have previously been identiﬁed as
climate change and overﬁshing (Österblom et al., 2007; Moellmann et al., 2009; Lindegren
et al., 2010). This corresponds well to the proposed theoretical model, where both,
economic as well as ecological factors inﬂuence the resilience of a ﬁshery.
While we explain the regime shift in the 1980s on an aggregate Baltic sea level in the
following subsection, we thereafter restrict our analysis of the economic consequences of
the Baltic sea regime shift to the interesting case of Finland. Finland is characterized by
a long coastline (4600 km, islands not included) and about 81 000 islands with an area of
more than 100 sqm in the Baltic sea. It's ﬁshery is almost exclusively located in the Baltic
sea area. Especially in rural areas there are only few employment alternatives other than
the ﬁshing and there is an ongoing concern for the continuity of employment possibilities
in the ﬁshing industry. In 2011 there were around 2800 persons employed in the harvest
sector and around 900 in ﬁsh processing. The most important commercial ﬁsheries in
the Baltic sea by volume are herring and sprat, that latter almost solely used for animal
fodder (OECD, 2003, 2014). Cod is traditionally only a minor ﬁshery in Finland since
cod ﬁshing grounds are further oﬀshore and thus less accessible.
We restrict our analysis to the case of Finland for two reasons: First, Finland is one of
the few countries that ﬁsh all three species of interest exclusively in the Baltic sea. Second,
Finland is the only state that provides suﬃcient long time series data on landings, landing
values and eﬀort levels which enables us to estimate elasticities of interest (FGFRI, 2014).
3.3.1 The Baltic: Population Dynamics, Harvesting, and the Regime Shift
We apply the population dynamics in Eq. (3.1) to the Baltic sea ecosystem, i.e. cod (c),
herring (h), and sprat (s). We use data on spawning stock biomass (SSB) from ICES
(2013a,b,d) for a period from 1974 (1963 for cod) to 2013. Historical data on aggregate
Baltic sea harvest, H, is available for the period from 1950 to 2010 is provided by ICES
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Cod Herring Sprat
Population Dynamics: Baltic Sea
r 0.887*** 0.877*** 0.647***
K 1.506*** 1.997*** 2.894***
µ -0.121* -0.141** -0.832**
Harvest Function: Aggregate Baltic Sea
B 0.865*** 0.399*** 1.599***
A 0.562*** 0.361*** 0.221***
Harvesting and Markets: Finland
c 0.676 0.000 3.709
e 0.261** -3.844 0.888
q 33.142*** 51.962*** 61.162***
χ 0.806*** 0.265* 0.174**
ν 0.314*** 0a 0a
p¯ 0.157 0.143*** 0.099***
⇒ b 1.769*** 0.196 0.370
⇒ a 0.079 0.090*** 0.017***
a: Restriction νh = νs = 0.
Signiﬁcance: 1% ***, 5% **, 10% *
Tab. 3.1: Estimated parameters for the Baltic sea system. The top two section list estimates
for the aggregate Baltic sea population dynamics (3.10) and open access harvest
functions (3.11). To bottom section lists estimated parameters for the Finish
market equilibrium system (3.13).
(2011).2 The growth of each stock in time t is approximated by the diﬀerence in stock
levels in subsequent years t and t+ 1 adjusted by harvest in year t.
In the growth function of cod and herring we include an `ecosystem dummy' that
accounts for the ecosystem regime shift.3 For sprat, this interaction eﬀect is the cod
stock. The formal regression model for the population dynamics separately for cod,
2 Cod and herring harvest and stock data is for ICES subdivision 25-32 (IIId). Sprat stock data is
for ICES subdivision 22-32, harvest for IIId. A detailed description of the utilized data is presented in
Appendix 3.5.5.
3 We test other variations of the population dynamics such as including the external eﬀect in sprat.
We also try incorporating possible competition between the two prey species, and creating a feed-back
loop between prey and predator. Also, eﬀects of changes in zooplankton concentration are investigated.
The ﬁnally chosen ecological model represents the most parsimonious model that is compatible with
previous and more in-depth foodweb models of the area. Results are also quite robust to the choice of
the regime shift time point. A summary can be found in Table 3.4 in Appendix 3.5.6.
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herring, and sprat (dropping ﬁshery subscripts i) is:
gt(x) = xt+1 − xt +Ht + εt = r xt
(
1− xt
K
)
+ µxt y + εt, (3.10)
with
ys =xc,t, yc = yh = Dt≥1988 =

1 if t ≥ 1988
0 else,
.
including the error terms εt.4 We make use of the fact the Eastern Baltic ﬁsh stock were
exploited under conditions close to open access until 2008 on an aggregate Baltic level,
and assume that the open-access condition in Eq. (3.5) holds until then.5 We estimate
the logarithmic aggregate open access harvest function separately for the three ﬁsheries
(dropping ﬁshery subscripts i) :
lnHt,oa = ln Aˆ+ Bˆ lnxt + t, ∀ t ≤ 2008, (3.11)
(3.12)
including the error terms t.6 The upper case coeﬃcients A, and B denote that the open
access harvest function is estimated on an aggregate Baltic level.
The top to sections of Table 3.1 sum up estimates of population dynamics (3.10),
and the aggregate open access harvest function.7 Point estimates and standard errors
of stock growth functions and open access harvest functions are used to depict possible
open access equilibria in the Baltic sea system in Figure 3.2. The colored '∆' are the
available observations for each ﬁtted growth curve, the colored 'o' depict observations
4 For details on the estimation and the error structure see Appendix 3.5.6.
5 We employ the criterion for de facto open access from Quaas et al. (2012). A ﬁshery is considered
de facto open-access when in at least three consecutive years between 1984 and 2008 the catch was less
than 90% of the total allowable catch (TAC) and no additional management measures are in place. This
is true for all considered ﬁsheries (ICES, 2013c).
6 For details on this regressions and the error structure see Appendix 3.5.7.
7 All estimated intrinsic growth rates and carrying capacities are signiﬁcant and in a reasonable range.
Quaas et al. (2012) estimate rˆc = 0.74 for the Baltic cod. Carrying capacity of cod has been previously
estimated at Kˆc = 2 million tons by Froese and Proelß (2010), and Kˆc = 1.875 by Quaas et al. (2012).
Also, Baltic Herring intrinsic growth and carrying capacity have been estimated by Quaas et al. (2012):
rˆh = 0.28, Kˆh = 4.667. To our knowledge, there are no similar estimates for Baltic sprat population
dynamics available.
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Fig. 3.2: Estimated stock growth and open access harvest using parameters lsited in Ta-
ble 3.1. Fitted grwoth functions are in green (pre-1988) and red (post-1988), and
open access functions in blue. The shaded areas around each curve depicts the ±
1 s.e. interval.
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for harvest. The colored curves represent the ﬁtted growth functions pre-regime shift
(green) and post-regime shift (orange), and the open access harvest functions (in blue)
for each species, and the shaded areas around the curves depict ± one standard error
conﬁdence regions around the estimates.
Estimated Baltic cod (panel (a)) and herring (panel(b)) growth and harvest functions
behave similarly. The regime shift leads to a decrease in the growth rates at any particular
stock size, and the de-facto carrying capacity of both stocks. The estimated open access
harvest function is concave for herring and cod. Pre-1988 growth and harvest function
intersect at a positive equilibrium stock level, xc,oa = 0.45 (xc,oa = 1.29), corresponding to
hc,oa = 0.28 (hh,oa = 0.4). The amplitude of the downward shift of the growth functions
after 1988 averts the intersection of the new stock growth functions and the open access
harvest functions. The open access equilibrium in both ﬁsheries disappears. Tipping
points for the eﬀect of the regime shift µc and µh (speciﬁed in Eq. (3.7)) for which the
ﬁsheries would just not collapse are estimated as µ¯c = −0.074 and µ¯h = −0.125. Hence,
for the de-facto unregulated Baltic herring and cod ﬁshery we ﬁnd both, an environmental
driver, i.e. the ecosystem regime shift, and "local" markets, i.e. the concavity of the open
access harvest function aﬀects the resilience of the Baltic system. The interplay between
the ecological and the economic factors leads to the collapse of both ﬁsheries in the
equilibrium.
The sprat growth function (in panel (c)), on the other hand, is not directly aﬀected by
the ecosystem eﬀect. While the orange curve depicts sprat growth at the pre-regime shift
equilibrium cod stock level (xc,oa = 0.45), the green shows sprat growth for a collapsed
cod population after the regime shift (xc = 0). The growth function shifts up and right,
increasing both growth rates at a particular stock size, and the de-facto carrying capacity
of sprat. The convex open access harvest function intersects both growth functions close
to their maximum.
This results indicate that the regime shift in 1988 aﬀected the Baltic sea equilibrium
such that both the herring and cod open-access ﬁshery were not viable anymore. The
sprat ﬁshery beneﬁted from the collapse of cod, that led to increasing equilibrium stock
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and harvest levels.
(a) Stock
(b) Harvest
Fig. 3.3: Simulated stock (a) and harvest (b) dynamics for cod (green), herring (red) and
sprat (blue). Diamonds depict estimated stock and harvest levels from ICES
(2013c). Continuous lines depict simulated development until 2008. Dahed lines
the simulated development after 2008.
Using the point estimates for growth and harvest function from Table 3.1, Figure 3.3
depicts simulated development of stock sizes (panel (a)) and open access harvest (panel
(b)) for all ﬁsheries after the ecosystem regime shift in 1988. We use starting values for
ﬁsh stock levels in 1988 just at the estimated stock biomass level from ICES (2013c).
Diamonds indicate observed values until 2008, continuous lines the simulation given the
parametrization in Table 3.1, and dashed lines the hypothetical development if the ﬁsh-
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eries were continuously de facto open access after 2008. We predict a steady decrease of
stock and open access harvest quantity of herring and cod after the shift in the ecosystem
at 1988, and a collapse of cod and herring after 45 years  given that harvest remains
unregulated. Due to a decrease in predation pressure, sprat biomass steadily increases
until it reaches its new open access equilibrium after 45 years.
3.3.2 Finland: Harvesting, Markets, and Rents
In the previous subsection we explained the Baltic sea regime shift by a combination
of ecological and economic factors that worked on an aggregate level. We derived new
equilibrium levels of ﬁsh stocks and simulated the corresponding stock path towards this
new equilibrium. In the following we aim at explaining the consequences of this regime
shift on the Finnish ﬁshery. Finland is just one among many actors in the Baltic sea
ﬁsheries. Hence, it makes sense to regard this shock on the ﬁshery as exogenous for
Finland and take the (simulated) development of the ﬁsh stocks after 1988 as given.
For Finland, we again assume that the open-access condition in Eq. (3.5) holds until
2008. Using time series of landings and landed values, we derive a time series of prices
pit for Baltic cod and sprat (FGFRI, 2014). Catch and stock biomass data is taken
from ICES (2013a,b,d) and ICES (2011).8 To ensure identiﬁcation of the model we
estimate the simultaneous equations system of market demand and supply jointly with the
transformed harvest production function (3.2) in terms of catch-per-unit-eﬀort (CPUE).
We approximate CPUE using
¯CPUEt = number of vessels in t · catch value of ﬁshery in ttotal catch value of all ﬁsheries in t ,
where information on the number of vessels and catch values are taken from FGFRI
(2014).
8 A detailed description of the utilized data is presented in appendix 3.5.5.
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The model of the open access market equilibrium is (dropping ﬁshery subscripts i):
demand: p(ht) =p¯h
−ν
t d,t
supply: uc(ht, xt) =ch
e
tx
−χ(1+e)
t s,t (3.13)
production: CPUEt = h/E¯ =qx
χ
t c,t
equilibrium condition: p(ht) =uc(ht, xt) = pt
including the error terms s,t, d,t, c,t.9 The bottom section of Table 3.1 sums up
estimates of the market equilibrium system (3.13). Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the cod and
sprat harvest functions switch from convex to concave (concave to convex respectively)
when looking at the Finish instead of the aggregate Baltic sea ﬁshery (see coeﬃcient
b in Table 3.1). Thus, it appears that input and output elasticities in the Finish cod
ﬁshery only play a minor role while they grow in importance in the sprat industry. Since
traditionally the Finish ﬁshing industry is more focused on small pelagics, the local labor
and capital markets may as well be more dependent these ﬁsheries. Hence, open access
harvest of sprat and herring is less elastic to changes in stock size. The Finish cod ﬁshery
that mainly consist of few trawls does react much more elastic to changes in stock size in
comparison.
Estimated economic coeﬃcients are mainly signiﬁcant, however, far from certain  the
number of observations being only N = 13 for each equation.10 The estimated demand
elasticity for cod is νˆc = 0.314, and we restrict the demand elasticities for herring and
sprat to νh = νs = 0 to achieve convergence in estimates. This makes sense, as a large
percentage of all herring and sprat catches in Finland are used for animal fodder and it
is seems reasonable to assume a ﬁxed world market price level for the pelagic ﬁsheries
(OECD, 2003). The input market eﬀect for the herring ﬁshery is negative, in contradiction
to our model assumptions, but insigniﬁcant.
9 For details on this regressions and the error structure see Appendix 3.5.8.
10 Comparable estimates from the literature are χˆc = 0.644 for the Baltic cod Kronbak (2004), χˆc
between 0.22 and 0.58 depending on the ﬁshing technique for the North East Arctic cod Richter et al.
(2011), and χˆh = 0.56 for the North Sea herring ﬁshery Nøstbakken and Bjørndal (2003). To our
knowledge the only relevant available estimate of the inverse price elasticity is for the North East Arctic
Cod νˆ = 0.5 by Richter et al. (2011).
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To cope with the uncertainty invoked by the estimation of parameters of interest,
we refrain from the use of only point estimates but conduct a thorough Monte-Carlo
sensitivity analysis, making use of the estimated co-variance matrices of estimates. We
draw N = 10000 samples from multinomial normal distributions, β ∼ N (βˆ, Cov(β)),
for each of the parameter sets to account for some of the uncertainty evoked by the
estimation.11
We calculate the present value of ﬁshermen and consumer surplus for each ﬁshery i
from 1988 to 2008 corresponding to predicted stock development for each parameter set,
PVFS =
2008∑
t=1988
1
(1 + δ)t−1988
ei
1 + ei
ci
(
hit
xχiit
)1+ei
PVCS =
2008∑
t=1988
1
(1 + δ)t−1988
νi
1− νi p¯ih
1−νi
it ,
where δ is the discount rate. Present values are calculated for the actual case when the
regime shifted in 1988, as well as a benchmark model  that is the hypothetical case
where the regime shift did not happen.
We furthermore calculate the eﬀect generated by the regime shift for each ﬁshery i,
quantifying the annuities on the change in present values for the ﬁshermen and consumer
surplus with the regime shift:
∆FS = δ (PVFS,with regime shift − PVFS,no regime shift) , (3.14)
∆CS = δ (PVCS,with regime shift − PVCS,no regime shift) . (3.15)
Figure 3.4 depicts the distribution of the eﬀect of the regime shift on ﬁshermen
surplus, ∆FS, for the three ﬁsheries: Cod in the top row, herring in the middle, and sprat
in the bottom. We only show changes in the ﬁshermen surplus, as the consumer surplus
varies in parallel to ﬁshermen surplus (cf. Proposition 3).
These top row in Figure 3.4 indicate that ﬁshermen and consumers in the cod ﬁshery
are the clear losers of the regime shifts. The distribution looks almost log-normally
11 For more details on the procedure see Appendix 3.5.9.
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Fig. 3.4: Histogram of the annuities of changes in ﬁshermen surplus for the cod (top row),
herring (middle) and sprat (bottom) ﬁsheries using a discount rate δ = 0.01. Panels
on the left show the annuities, panels on the right the log annuities.
distributed around a mean of roughly −1 million Euros. As the middle row indicates,
also the stakeholders in the herring ﬁshery have incurred a loss from the regime shift.
The distribution is bi-modal, with one peak at around −1 million Euros, and another one
at around −7 million Euros. This bi-modal shape is a consequence of the uncertainty in
economic parameters, which is apparent already in Figure 3.2(b).12 Depending on the
exact constellation of economic and biological parameters, collapse may be globally stable
or not after the regime shift. If the regime shift triggers a collapse in the open-access
ﬁshery, the loss is much higher than if it doesn't.
Finally the bottom row in Figure 3.4 focuses on eﬀects on sprat ﬁshermen. The
12 The bi-modal shape is less distinct for larger discount rates δ. Figure 3.6 depicts the histograms
above for a discount rate δ = 0.1 where this bi-modality is not detectable anymore. This is because the
long term eﬀects of the regime shift are weighted much less than immediate eﬀects for a larger discount
rate.
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stakeholders in the sprat ﬁshery have gained from the regime shift, with a distribution
centered around 0.1 million Euros. The gain for the sprat ﬁshery is thus much smaller
than the loss for the two other ﬁsheries. On aggregate, the regime shift thus has caused
a substantial loss for the Finnish ﬁsheries.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the consequences of a regime shift on the functional interest
groups in a multi-species ﬁshery. We have argued that also under conditions of open
access the ﬁshery creates welfare in terms of ﬁshermen and consumer surplus, if marginal
ﬁshing costs are increasing, and demand for ﬁsh is imperfectly elastic. We have shown
that the shape of the marginal cost and inverse demand functions inﬂuence the shape of
the open-access harvest as a function of current stock size and thus the stability of the
ﬁshery under open access. We have further shown that under open-access conditions,
changes in the stock size aﬀect ﬁshermen and consumers of ﬁsh proportionally. Thus, a
regime shift will aﬀect the stakeholders in one ﬁshery in a similar way. In a multi-species
setting, a regime shift may create winners and losers, though.
To quantify these eﬀects, we have applied the model to the Baltic sea ecological-
economic system that is dominated by three major ﬁsheries: cod, sprat and herring. We
model an exogenous climate shock that directly aﬀects the cod and herring stocks and
indirectly (via its main predator) the sprat population. On an aggregate Baltic sea level,
both, the cod and herring ﬁshery are characterized by suﬃciently inelastic input and/or
output markets such that the response of harvest with respect to changes in stock size is
weak (the harvest function is inelastic). This, in combination with the exogenous climate
shock leads to a shift in the ecological-economic system.
We furthermore estimate changes in consumer surpluses and factor rents due to the
ecological regime shift for the case of Finland. There are winners and losers of the
ecosystem regime shift. The stakeholders in the sprat ﬁshery gain from the increased
availability of sprat after the regime shift. Consumers and ﬁshermen in the cod and
herring ﬁsheries, by contrast, face a net loss after the regime shift, which is much higher
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than the gains in the sprat ﬁshery.
It has previously been analyzed how diﬀerent management strategies for the Baltic
ﬁsheries would impose regional trade-oﬀs since quotas for diﬀerent ﬁsheries are distributed
subject to a stability criterion (Voss et al., 2014). Drawing on the EU's annual Baltic
quota distribution of sprat and cod in a similar fashion, it is likely that many of sprat
producers are located in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia but also in Poland and Sweden.13
Cod quotas are concentrated on mainly Sweden, Denmark, and Poland where the loss for
workers and consumers will have been most severe after the regime shift.
There is evidence for similar regime shifts in several other ecosystems. The Newfound-
land cod that disappeared in the early 1990s and only very recently seems to return, gave
way to a very valuable snow crab and lobster ﬁshery that exceeded the historic cod ﬁshery
in terms of annual catch value. For Newfoundland, the consequence of the 1990s regime
shift, thus, might be not as unambiguous as it is the case for the Baltic sea.
Since our analysis is focused on unregulated ﬁsheries, the developing world with its
many de-facto open access management regimes provides further, more recent, possible
applications. Management eﬀectiveness in low-income is often insuﬃcient (Mora et al.,
2009), illegal and unregulated ﬁshing very common (Agnew et al., 2009). The proposed
theoretical model may not only assess the vulnerability of ﬁsheries of the developing
world, but also help estimating the consequences (i.e. the eﬀects on rents) of potential
regime shifts.
Applying the proposed model to other ecosystems to analyze changes in realized
rents, however, strongly depends on the availability of relevant data. Although data
requirements are quite modest, i.e. it is not necessary to acquire detailed data on factor
and output markets, experience shows us that in ﬁsheries especially quantifying cost
relationships is challenging.
13 These quotas can be obtained from http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/
index_en.htm.
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3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 The Cost Function and Open Access Harvest
In this section we aim to show how the cost function (3.3) and the open access harvest
function (3.5) could be derived using isoelastic supply functions for factor along with a
Cobb-Douglas eﬀort production function. In the following we make use of the economic
model proposed in chapter 2 of this thesis that explicitly considers markets for inputs
in a ﬁshery as well as the output demand to determine open access harvest (Fricke and
Quaas, 2015a). Harvesting is described by the generalized Gordon-Schaefer production
function h = q E xχ, where χ > 0 denotes the schooling parameter, and q > 0 denotes
the `catchability'. The ﬁshing eﬀort E can be though of as an intermediate product that
itself is produced by means of labor l and capital k using Cobb-Douglas technology with
constant returns to scale:
E = lϕ k1−ϕ (3.16)
with ϕ ∈ (0, 1). Capital and labor are supplied on local markets. We furthermore assume
iso-elastic inverse supply functions,
w(l) = ω lζ , (3.17)
r(k) = κ kψ. (3.18)
Fishermen minimize their costs to determine their optimal harvest quantity in each pe-
riod. Thus, they have to take local factor markets into account when they decide on their
harvest strategy. The representative ﬁrm's cost minimization problem
min
l,k
wl + rk
s.t. Eqs. (3.2), (3.16)
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yields the factor demand functions
l =
h
q xχeρ t
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
r
w
)1−ϕ
(3.19)
k =
h
q xχeρ t
(
1− ϕ
ϕ
w
r
)ϕ
(3.20)
and a cost function that is linear in harvest,
c˜(h,w, r;x) =
wϕ r1−ϕ
ϕϕ (1− ϕ)1−ϕ
h
q xχeρ t
. (3.21)
In labor and capital market equilibrium, we ﬁnd (using (3.19) in (3.17), (3.20) in (3.18)
respectively)
w = ω lζ = ω
(
h
q xχeρ t
)ζ (
ϕ
1− ϕ
r
w
)ζ (1−ϕ)
, (3.22)
r = κ kψ = κ
(
h
q xχeρ t
)ψ (
1− ϕ
ϕ
w
r
)ψ ϕ
. (3.23)
The market equilibrium cost function can then be written as
c(h, x) = c
(
h
xχ
)e+1
,
with c > 0, and
e = e(ζ, ψ, ϕ) ≥ 0, ∂e
∂ζ
> 0,
∂e
∂ψ
> 0
The non-linearity is caused by the term e, that decreases in both, the inverse price
elasticity of labor and capital. It equals zero if both input factor supplies are perfectly
elastic (ζ = 0 and ψ = 0). In that case the equilibrium cost function reduces to c(h, x) =
c h x−χ, thus, increases linearly in harvest quantity.
We assume an iso-elastic inverse demand function for the harvest, allowing for imper-
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fectly elastic demand. The inverse demand function is
p(h) = p¯ h−ν ,
where ν is the inverse price elasticity of demand, where we assume 0 ≤ ν < 1. The
restriction ν < 1 means that revenues p h will increase with harvest.
Using the zero proﬁt condition, p(h)h = c(h, x), we obtain the open access harvest
level as an iso-elastic, monotonically increasing function of stock biomass,
hoa =
( p¯
c
) 1
(e+v)
xχ
(e+1)
(e+v) eρ
(e+1)
(e+v)
t ≡ a xb ec t.
For x ∈ (0, ), we identify following cases
b T 1 for χ− ν
1− χ S e. (3.24)
For a concave open access harvest function it must hold that e is suﬃciently large. As
e increases in both, ζ and ψ, for suﬃciently inelastic capital and/or labor supply and a
schooling parameter of less then unity the open access harvest function is concave.
3.5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Open access population dynamics are given by
x˙ = g(x)− hoa(x), (3.25)
with
g′(x) = r(1− 2x
K
) + µy,
g′′(x) = −2r
K
< 0.
Proof. Under condition (3.7), the expression on the right-hand side of Eq. (3.25) is nega-
tive for all x, as we show in the following. A local extremum (over all x) of net population
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growth (the right-hand side (RHS) of (3.25)) is determined by the condition
g′(x)− h′oa(x) = 0
r(1− 2x
K
) + µy − b a x¯b−1 = 0
⇔ a x¯b = rx¯
b
(1− 2x¯
K
) +
µyx¯
b
. (3.26)
For x¯ = Θ, the left-hand side (LHS) of (3.26) is larger than the RHS,
aΘb >
rΘ
b
(1− 2Θ
K
) +
µyΘ
b
which holds by condition (3.7). Around x¯, the LHS of (3.26) is monotonically increasing
in x¯, and the RHS is monotonically decreasing in x¯, otherwise x¯ would not be a local
maximum. Thus, it must be that x¯ < Θ.
Using (3.26) in the RHS of (3.1), we obtain
r x
(
1− x
K
)
+ µy x − axb
< r x¯
(
1− x¯
K
)
+ µy x¯ − ax¯b
= r x¯
(
1− x¯
K
)
+ µy x¯ −
(
rx¯
b
(1− 2x¯
K
) +
µyx¯
b
)
= x¯
(
r
(
1− x¯
K
)
+ µy − r
b
(1− 2x¯
K
)− µy
b
)
= x¯
(
x¯− r − r/b+ µy − µyb
r/K − 2r/Kb
)
= x¯ (x¯−Θ) ,
For x¯ < Θ, the expression on the right hand side is negative, that is, the maximum
amount of net growth of the predator stock is zero.
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3.5.3 Calculation of Rents
With (3.22) in (3.23) ( (3.23) in (3.22) respectively) we derive the equilibrium wage and
capital rental rate
weq =
(
ω1+ψ ϕ
(
h
q xχeρ t
)ζ (1+ψ) (
κϕ
1− ϕ
)ζ (1−ϕ)) 11+ψ ϕ+ζ (1−ϕ)
, (3.27)
req =
(
κ1+ζ (1−ϕ)
(
h
q xχeρ t
)ψ (1+ζ) (
ω (1− ϕ)
ϕ
)ψ ϕ) 11+ψ ϕ+ζ (1−ϕ)
. (3.28)
Worker surplus is deﬁned as the area between the equilibrium wage rate and the
inverse labor supply curve:
WS = weq leq −
leq∫
0
ω lζ dl =
ζ
1 + ζ
ω l1+ζeq =
ζ
1 + ζ
ω−
1
ζ w
1+ζ
ζ
eq
=
ζ
1 + ζ
(
ω(1+ψ)ϕ
(
h
q xχ
)(1+ζ) (1+ψ) (
κϕ
1− ϕ
)(1+ζ) (1−ϕ)) 11+ψ ϕ+ζ (1−ϕ)
=
ζ
1 + ζ
ωα
(
κϕ
1− ϕ
)β (
h
q xχ
)1+e
= ϕ
ζ
1 + ζ
c
(
h
xχ
)1+e
Analogous, capital owner surplus is deﬁned as the area between the equilibrium capital
rental rate and the inverse capital supply curve:
RS =
ψ
1 + ψ
κ−
1
ψ r
1+ψ
ψ
eq
=
ψ
1 + ψ
(
κ(1+ζ) (1−ϕ)
(
h
q xχ
)(1+ψ) (1+ζ) (
ω (1− ϕ)
ϕ
)(1+ψ)ϕ) 11+ψ ϕ+ζ (1−ϕ)
=
ψ
1 + ψ
κβ
(
ω (1− ϕ)
ϕ
)α (
h
q xχ
)1+e
= (1− ϕ) ψ
1 + ψ
c
(
h
xχ
)1+e
Total factor surplus then is the sum of capital owner surplus and worker surplus:
FS = WS +RS =
(
ϕ
ζ
1 + ζ
(1− ϕ) ψ
1 + ψ
)
c
(
h
xχ
)1+e
=
e
1 + e
c
(
h
xχ
)1+e
(3.29)
This is just the same as the area between open access equilibrium output price p∗ and
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the unit cost curve:
FS = p∗ h−
∫ h
0
c(h, x)
h
dh
= p∗ h− 1
1 + e
c
(
h
xχ
)1+e
!
=
e
1 + e
c
(
h
xχ
)1+e
⇒ p∗ h != c
(
h
xχ
)1+e
p∗ h != c(h, x),
which, by the open access zero proﬁt condition, is true.
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3.5.4 Empirical Part
3.5.5 Data Summary
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Units
Data on Aggregate Baltic Fisheries (Source: ICES (2011, 2013c))
Hc 61 0.143 0.089 0.032 0.405 mio t
Hs 61 0.166 0.147 0.001 0.505 mio t
Hh 61 0.282 0.106 0.053 0.441 mio t
xc 47 0.239 0.173 0.062 0.643 mio t
xh 39 0.932 0.382 0.419 1.683 mio t
xs 39 0.965 0.422 0.268 1.931 mio t
Data on Finish ﬁsheries (Source: FGFRI (2014))
vessels 19 3500.789 284.566 3163 3988 number
CPUEc 18 6.034 2.535 3.331 12.648 t/vessel
CPUEh 18 46.845 5.778 36.723 55.481 t/vessel
CPUEs 18 62.584 10.589 53.462 98.097 t/vessel
hall 34 0.100 0.018 0.060 0.138 mio t
hc 34 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.005 mio t
hh 34 0.083 0.014 0.052 0.122 mio t
hs 34 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.027 mio t
pc 34 0.942 0.442 0.200 1.649 Euro/kg
ph 34 0.169 0.033 0.123 0.280 Euro/kg
ps 34 0.242 0.152 0.061 0.502 Euro/kg
Tab. 3.2: Summary of Utilized Data. This table lists the number of observations (Obs.),
the mean, standard deviation (Std. Dev.), and minimum and maximum observed
level of required data for the estimation of population dynamics, aggregate open
access harvest, and the market equilibrium for Finland.
Table 3.2 summarizes employed data on harvest (H, h), stock size (x), prices (p),
and Catch per unit eﬀort (CPUE). ICES (2011, 2013c) provide data on aggregate Baltic
harvest levels from 1950 to 2010 and stock estimates from 1974 (1966 for cod) to 2012.
FGFRI (2014) provide data on harvest and landed value for all species, from which we
derive local prices p. Catch-per-unit eﬀort is calculated as harvest divided by vessels allo-
cated to the ﬁshery. The latter is calculated as the total number of vessels (summarized
in the table) multiplied by the value share of each ﬁshery. There is quite some variation
in the number of vessels in the dataset. Variations in our measure for CPUE are caused
by both, changes in the number of vessels and variations in value share.
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Fig. 3.5: Available Time Series Data on aggregate harvest (top left), Finish harvest (top
right), stock levels (bottom left), and Finish price levels (bottom right). Cod is
depicted in green, herring in red and sprat in blue color.
Figure 3.5 depicts observed stock, price and aggregate and Finish harvest development
over time. Finish harvest levels (top right) do  to some extend  correspond to changes
in aggregate harvest levels in the Baltic ( top left). Sprat landings jump up in the mid
1990s.14 Cod landings are low but still decline over time. Only herring landings ﬂuctuate
more or less constantly around 80 000 t.
Finnish prices for cod vary signiﬁcantly, supporting the assumption that output mar-
kets are local and demand is not perfectly elastic. Except for a signiﬁcant drop in sprat
prices in the mid 1990s from around 0.5 Euro to 0.15 Euro (the same time Finish and
aggregate landings suddenly jumped), prices for the two pelagic species are relatively
constant over time compared to the cod price.
14 This is a development not restricted to Finland but observed in several countries (ICES, 2013d)
leading to the peak in overall catches of more than half a million tonnes.
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3.5.6 Population Dynamics
Population dynamics (in Eqs. (3.10)) are estimated separately for each ﬁshery, making use
of data on aggregate harvest H and stock size x, using non-linear least square estimator
with Newey-West errors. A Breusch-Pagan Test for contemporaneous correlation of the
errors indicated that the H0 hypothesis of independence of the three equations cannot be
rejected at any reasonable level. Estimated parameters are listed in Table 3.3. We detect
a signiﬁcantly negative ecosystem eﬀect µi on the growth function of cod and herring.
Estimates for intrinsic growth rates and carrying capacities for all three species are well
within a reasonable range.
Cod Herring Sprat
y = Dt≥1988 Dt≥1988 xc,t
r 0.887*** 0.877*** 0.647***
0.064 0.116 0.169
K 1.506*** 1.997*** 2.894***
0.173 0.085 0.744
µ -0.121* -0.141** -0.832**
0.062 0.057 0.355
R2 0.966 0.966 0.592
N 45 37 37
Breusch-Pagan Test for independence
LM = 6.327
p-value 0.097
NLS estimates with robust standard errors.
Standard errors below estimates. Signiﬁcance: 1%*** 5% ** 10%*
Tab. 3.3: Estimates of population dynamics for cod, herring and sprat. Below the list
of estimates, we list the result of the Breusch-Pagan test for independence of
regressions.
Table 3.4 lists variations of the proposed stock dynamics using diﬀerent time points
for the regime shift as well as other possible interactions. Changes in the choice of regime
shift do not aﬀect information criteria and R2 much for cod and herring. Other species
interactions are mostly insigniﬁcant.
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Stock/Method Eﬀect y sign(µ) p-value(µ) log(Likel) AIC BIC R2
Cod/NLS
none n.a. n.a. 87.067 -170.134 -166.520 0.964
D1988 − 0.056 88.661 -171.321 -165.901 0.966
D1987 − 0.017 89.409 -172.818 -167.398 0.967
D1989 − 0.130 88.188 -170.377 -164.957 0.965
Zooplankton + 0.115 69.930 -133.861 -129.110 0.965
Herring + 0.025 72.394 -138.788 -133.955 0.967
Sprat + 0.911 70.102 -134.204 -129.371 0.959
Herring/NLS
none n.a. n.a. 47.130 -90.260 -87.038 0.956
D1988 − 0.019 51.629 -97.258 -92.426 0.966
D1987 − 0.036 51.329 -96.658 -91.825 0.965
D1989 − 0.074 49.866 -93.733 -88.900 0.962
Zooplankton + 0.010 50.675 -95.351 -90.600 0.967
Cod + 0.039 48.957 -91.915 -87.082 0.960
Sprat − 0.306 47.670 -89.340 -84.507 0.957
Sprat/NLS
none n.a. n.a. 1.593 0.815 4.037 0.516
Zooplankton + 0.112 3.775 -1.551 3.200 0.584
Herring − 0.006 5.980 -5.960 -1.127 0.618
Cod − 0.025 4.742 -3.484 1.349 0.592
Tab. 3.4: Model variations for population dynamics. The table lists information criteria
(AIC, BIC),R2, likelihood, direction and signiﬁcance of parameters µ for diﬀerent
choices of the interaction eﬀect y for cod, herring, and sprat.
3.5.7 Harvesting: All Baltic Sea
We estimate the logarithmic open access harvest function (as in (3.11)) making use of data
on aggregate harvest levels H and stock size x for the three Baltic sea ﬁsheries separately
using instrumental variable estimation with robust standard errors. Due to existing
endogeneity, stock levels in t are instrumented with their lagged values. Estimates are
listed in Table 3.5. We test for the existence of a trend term to control for technological
progress as suggested in chapter 2 of the thesis (Fricke and Quaas, 2015a). The estimated
trend coeﬃcient c is insigniﬁcant at a 5% level for two out of three cases. We therefore
exclude it from the ﬁnal regression.
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Cod Herring Sprat
Bi 0.865*** 0.399*** 1.599***
0.07 0.09 0.21
lnAi -0.577*** -1.02*** -1.51***
0.09 0.02 0.09
⇒ Ai 0.562*** 0.3605*** 0.221***
N 42 34 34
F (1, N − 2) 171.8 21.912 59.5
Prob 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wu-Hausman test of exogeneity of xit:
F (1, N − 3) 17.094 13.730 9.066
Prob 0.000 0.000 0.005
Breusch-Pagan Test for independence
LM = 5.307
p− value > χ2(3) = 0.151
Parameter for technological progress (excluded)
ci 0.002 -0.027*** 0.020*
Using 3SLS estimation with Newey-West standard errors.
Instrumented: xi,t−1 for xit.
Standard errors below estimates. Signiﬁcance: 1%*** 5% ** 10%*
Tab. 3.5: Baltic region: Estimated open-access harvest functions for cod, herring, and sprat.
Tests for exogeneity of xit, independence and technological progress below the list
of estimates.
3.5.8 Harvesting and Markets: Finland
We make use of harvest levels h, price levels p and CPUE data from FGFRI (2014) and
combine it with data on stock sizes x from ICES (2013c) to estimate elasticities and other
necessary coeﬃcients for the Finish ﬁshing economy. To estimate the model of the open
access market equilibrium from Eqs. (3.13) we need to rewrite it in reduced form (Greene,
2003, Ch. 15). Using p(ht) = uc(ht, xt) and solving for ht we get:
ht =
( p¯
c
)1/(e+ν)
xχ
1+e
e+ν
(
d,t
s,t
)1/(e+ν)
.
Plugging this back into the demand function, we derive
pt = c
( p¯
c
)e/(e+ν)
x−νχ
1+e
e+ν d,t
(
d,t
s,t
)e/(e+ν)
.
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Finally, taking logarithms we derive the reduced for equations:
ln pt = ln(ca
e)− νb lnxt + ln ηp,t (3.30)
lnht = ln a+ b lnxt + ln ηh,t (3.31)
and:
lnCPUEt = ln q + χ lnxt + ln c,t (3.32)
with
a =
( p¯
c
) 1
(e+v)
, b =χ
(e+ 1)
(e+ v)
,
ηp,t =d,t
(
d,t
s,t
)e/(e+ν)
, ηh,t =
(
d,t
s,t
)1/(e+ν)
.
Note that Eq. (3.31) of the reduced form model is just the open access harvest func-
tion (3.5).
The reduced form equilibrium model is estimated separately for each ﬁshery as a
system of seemingly unrelated equations using FGNLS estimation and robust standard
errors.15 For the sprat and herring ﬁshery we impose the restriction νh = νs = 0 to derive
convergence while the cod system is estimated without any constraints.
The actual regression equations (as used in Stata) look like the following.
For Cod:
ln pt =
e
e+ ν
ln p¯+
ν
e+ ν
ln c− νχ1 + e
e+ ν
lnxt + ln ηp,t
lnht =
1
e+ ν
ln p¯+
1
e+ ν
ln c+ χ
1 + e
e+ ν
lnxt + ln ηh,t
lnCPUEt = ln q + χ lnxt + ln c,t
15 The model could theoretically be estimated using OLS and in a regular SUR setting. However, since
we impose cross-equation restrictions on parameters, using an FGNLS model is much more practical.
For more details see Stata's nlsur command.
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For Herring and Sprat:
ln pt =p¯+ ln ηp,t
lnht = ln a︸︷︷︸
1
e
ln p¯− 1
e
ln c
+χ E︸︷︷︸
1+e
e
lnxt + ln ηh,t
lnCPUEt = ln q + χ lnxt + ln c,t
Results from these estimations are listed in the 'Main Results' column in Table 3.6.16
Main Results Unrestricted Estimations
Cod Sprat Herring Sprat Herring
Restrictions: - p = p¯ p = p¯ - -
e 0.261** 0.8876 -3.844 112.979*** 281.088***
0.12 1.37 5.40 2.14 8.53
ν 0.314*** - - 0.807** -0.119
0.12 - - 0.33 0.5
ln p¯ -1.849** -2.311*** -1.945*** -5.534*** -1.644
0.79 0.06 0.03 1.32 1.25
ln c -0.391 1.3107 -11.206 456.895 666.422
0.64 5.50 12.81 . .
χ 0.806*** 0.174** 0.265* 0.298* 0.246**
0.07 0.07 0.14 0.16 0.12
ln q 3.500*** 3.950*** 4.114*** 4.085*** 3.939***
0.17 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.08
Leading to:
a 0.079 0.017*** 0.090*** 0.0171*** 0.0927
0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
b 1.769*** 0.370 0.196 0.2983* 0.247
0.37 0.42 0.13 0.1603 0.125
N 13 13 13 13 13
R2p 0.518 0 0 0.078 -0.009
R2h 0.61 0.061 0.066 0.065 0.057
R2CPUE 0.817 0.174 0.194 0.211 0.192
Standard errors below estimates. Signiﬁcance: 1%*** 5% ** 10%*
Tab. 3.6: Finland: Estimated production function and market equilibrium for cod, herring
and sprat. The table lists main regression results used for the simulations (left
side) as well as results of the unrestricted regressions (νs, νh 6= 0) on the right
side.
16 Estimates of the unrestricted, non-converging systems for sprat and herring are listed in the same
table on the right side.
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3.5.9 Rents in the Finish Fishing Industry
Table 3.7 lists vectors of point estimates (α, β, γ) and corresponding covariance matrices
(Cov) of the open access harvest functions, stock growth functions, and market equilib-
rium for all three species. We draw N = 10000 parameter combinations separately from
the multinomial normal distributions indicated in Table 3.7.
Figure 3.6 depicts the distribution of the eﬀect of the regime shift on ﬁshermen surplus,
∆FS, for the three ﬁsheries: Cod in the top row, herring in the middle, and sprat in the
bottom for a discount rate δ = 0.1.
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Population Dynamics
αc=
r
=
0.887
Covαc=
0.004 -0.008 0.003
K 1.506 -0.008 0.030 -0.004
µ 0.121 0.003 -0.004 0.004
αs=
r
=
0.647
Covαs=
0.029 -0.101 0.042
K 2.894 -0.101 0.553 -0.081
µ 0.832 0.042 -0.081 0.126
αh=
r
=
0.877
Covαh=
0.013 -0.009 0.006
K 1.997 -0.009 0.007 -0.004
µ 0.141 0.006 -0.004 0.003
Finland: Harvesting and Markets
βc=
e
=
0.261
Covβc=
0.014 -0.003 0.021 0.070 -0.001 -0.004
ν 0.314 -0.003 0.014 -0.091 -0.023 0.002 0.006
ln p¯ -1.849 0.021 -0.091 0.617 0.162 -0.017 -0.046
ln c -0.391 0.070 -0.023 0.162 0.408 -0.022 -0.056
χ 0.806 -0.001 0.002 -0.017 -0.022 0.005 0.012
ln q 3.501 -0.004 0.006 -0.046 -0.056 0.012 0.029
βs=
ln p¯
=
-2.311
Covβs=
0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001
ln a -4.080 0.002 0.018 -0.007 -0.188 0.001
χ 0.174 -0.002 -0.007 0.005 0.081 0.001
(1 + e)/e 2.127 -0.004 -0.188 0.081 3.025 -0.023
ln q 4.114 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.023 0.001
βh=
ln p¯
=
-1.945
Covβh=
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001
ln a -2.409 0.001 0.007 0.007 0.018 0.004
χ 0.265 0.001 0.007 0.019 -0.009 0.011
(1 + e)/e 0.740 0.003 0.018 -0.009 0.133 -0.009
ln q 3.951 0.001 0.004 0.011 -0.009 0.007
Baltic Sea: Open Access Harvest
γc =
lnA
=
0.865
Covγc
0.004 0.005
B -0.577 0.005 0.007
γs =
lnA
=
1.599
Covγs
0.043 -0.001
B -1.512 -0.001 0.008
γh =
lnA
=
0.399
Covγh
0.007 -0.001
B -1.020 -0.001 0.001
Tab. 3.7: Estimates and covariance matrices of population dynamics (top), Finland harvest
(middle), and aggregate harvest (bottom). The table lists unconverted estimates
on the left and corresponding covariance matrices on the right.
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Fig. 3.6: Histogram of the annuities of changes in ﬁshermen surplus for the cod (top row),
herring (middle) and sprat (bottom) ﬁsheries using a discount rate δ = 0.1. Panels
on the left show the annuities, panels on the right the log annuities.
4. ECONOMIC DRIVERS OF REGIME SHIFTS IN OPTIMALLY
MANAGED FISHERIES
Fogo Island, Newfoundland
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4.1 Introduction: Optimal Management and Regime Shifts
Limited resilience and regime shifts have been discovered in various terrestrial and aquatic
ecological systems (Biggs et al., 2012). A system is called multistable when - depending
on the initial conditions - it can stabilize in several diﬀerent equilibria. When shocked,
a multistable system may cross a tipping point and move towards a new equilibrium.
These abrupt changes from one state to another are commonly called regime shifts. The
resilience of a system is usually characterized by its ability to buﬀer shocks without
shifting to a new stable state (Scheﬀer et al., 2001).
While multistability can result from ecologic dynamics and interactions (such as
predator-prey dynamics and/or minimum viable population levels), empirical evidence
suggests that (especially unregulated) human interaction often decreases the stability of
an ecosystem (Folke et al., 2004). How and why unregulated ﬁshing may lead to regime
shifts in marine ecosystems has been discussed extensively in chapter 2 and 3 of this
thesis (Fricke and Quaas, 2015a,b). Therefore, the interplay between human actions and
ecosystem dynamics is key to understanding the stability of ecosystems.
In resource economics, the possibility of multistability has long been part of theoretical
models of open access and optimal management (Levhari et al., 1981; Dasgupta, 1982).
One typical approach to model multistability and limited resilience in economic-ecologic
systems is to couple initially stable ecological systems with economic dynamics, which
can lead to a destabilization of the overall system. Alternatively, intrinsically multistable
ecological systems may or may not be stabilized by human interactions and management
of the corresponding ecological-economic system (examples for both can be found in Mäler
et al. (2003); Horan et al. (2011); Quaas et al. (2013)).
While unregulated bioeconomic systems generally tend to be less stable than regulated
ones, 'optimal' management of resources does not necessarily imply a stabilization of the
coupled system. It has been shown that both the quality of institutions (Horan et al.,
2011), and human preferences for consumption diversity and patience (Quaas et al., 2013)
may lead to multistability in optimally managed ﬁsheries.
In this paper I investigate the determinants of resilience and regime shift in an oceanic
4. Economic Drivers of Regime Shifts in Optimally Managed Fisheries 72
economic-ecologic system. In particular I look at the economic drivers (prices and costs)
of multistability in optimally managed predator-prey ﬁsheries. The underlying ecological
system is an intrinsically stable model of two interacting species which are both harvested
independently of each other. Interactions between the two resources are thus restricted
to the ecological side (predator-prey dynamics). I will regard these two resources as ﬁsh
species that are both caught by independent ﬁshing ﬂeets.
The model here is a simpliﬁed version of the bioeconomic model developed by Fricke
and Quaas (2015a,b) in chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis. There we assumed an underlying
harvesting technology under which catch per unit of eﬀort does not decrease linearly with
stock size. We also explicitly model input and output markets to investigate producer
and consumer surplus generated by the ﬁsheries.
One of the simpliﬁcations employed in this paper is the utilization of a Gordon-
Schaefer harvesting technology where the stock-output elasticity equals unity. I take input
markets into account for constructing the cost function, which is assumed to be quadratic
in harvest. Lastly, output demand is assumed to be perfectly elastic. These restrictions
facilitate the derivation of analytic results for the optimally managed ﬁshery. However,
I will show that even in such a simpliﬁed model universal conditions for multistability
cannot be derived analytically such that one has to rely on numerical results.
For this purpose I calibrate the model to ﬁt two prominent examples of predator-prey
ﬁsheries: the Baltic cod and sprat, and the Newfoundland cod and snow crab ﬁshery.
Both ecosystems experienced regime shifts in the early 1990s, which were mainly caused
by overﬁshing along with changes in climate variables (Moellmann et al., 2009; Myers
et al., 1996). In both ecosystems the predator stock collapsed while prey abundances
increased due to decreasing predatory pressure. The interesting diﬀerence between these
systems is the economic value of the prey species. In the Baltic sea, sprat is low priced and
mainly used as ﬁsh fodder, while the Newfoundland snow crab is a high priced gourmet
food. In both cases eﬀort is made to rebuild the cod stocks to pre-collapse levels. The
results in this paper suggests that these eﬀorts are worthwhile.
I show how changes in economic parameters (price levels and harvesting costs) aﬀect
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the location of optima, and the system's resilience. In particular, I look at how these
changes can lead to regime shifts in the optimally managed ﬁshery for both ecosystems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 4.2, I present the
bioeconomic model and describe the optimization problem analytically. In Section 4.3, I
apply the model to the Baltic cod and sprat, and the Newfoundland cod and snow crab
ﬁshery. In section 4.4 summarize the results and brieﬂy conclude.
4.2 The Theoretical Model
In the following, I sketch the bioeconomic model, which is a simpliﬁed version of the
model in (Fricke and Quaas, 2015a,b).1 The assumed population dynamics for predator
(xc) and prey (xs) biomass follow a logistic growth function,
x˙c = rc xc
(
1− xc
kc
)
− hc,
x˙s = rs xs
(
1− xs
ks
)
− µs xs xc − hs, (4.1)
where rc, rs > 0 are the intrinsic growth rates, kc, ks > 0 the capacity limits, and hc, hs
the harvest rates. Predator-prey interactions enter the prey dynamics linearly, where µs is
the predator's success rate when meeting prey at random in a homogeneous environment.2
The basic idea behind this interaction is that the predator is an opportunistic feeder with
several food sources, such that the prey's biomass does not feed back into the predator's
population dynamics.
Note that interactions between ﬁsheries solely exist on the ecological side. On the
economic side - costs, harvest, input and output markets - I assume that they are inde-
pendent. This makes sense if the two ﬁsheries (denoted by the subscript i = c, s) are
reasonably diﬀerent from each other, e.g. focusing on diﬀerent seasons and utilizing dif-
ferent technologies. Therefore, the following parameters allow for heterogeneity between
1 Here, I only sketch the main characteristics of the model. More details and derivations can be found
in Appendix 4.5.1.
2 This simpliﬁed form of interaction is known from literature on ﬁsheries (Flaaten, 1991; Brown et al.,
2005) and grazing systems (Walker et al., 1981).
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ﬁsheries.
Harvesting is described by the Gordon-Schaefer production function, hi = qiEi xi,
where qi > 0 denotes the so-called `catchability'. The ﬁshing eﬀort Ei can be thought
of as an intermediate product that is produced by diﬀerent input factors. I furthermore
assume that the production technology is of Cobb-Douglas type with constant returns to
scale and that production factors are supplied on local markets, with iso-elastic supply
functions.
Fishing enterprises minimize their costs subject to factor supply with the additional
restriction that the ﬁshing industry is characterized by strongly decreasing returns to
scale, that is the cost function is quadratic in harvest (esg. Nieminen et al. (2012);
Arnason et al. (2004)). The market equilibrium cost function can thus be written as3
ci(hi, xi) = ci
(
hi
xi
)2
, (4.2)
with ci > 0. The non-linear cost structure allows for positive factor rents, denoted as
ﬁsherman's surplus, FSi =
ci
2
(
hi
xi
)2
.
Finally I assume output demand for all ﬁsh species to be perfectly elastic. Hence,
output prices are set to the world market level:
pi(hi) = p¯i. (4.3)
This is a reasonable assumption for many ﬁsheries such as small pelagics that supply a
global market for ﬁsh oil, or larger demersal species that accommodate the market for
white ﬁsh.
4.2.1 The Optimization Problem
The social planner maximizes the present value of proﬁts along with ﬁsherman's surplus
for both ﬁsheries given constant prices (4.3) and the cost function (4.2). The correspond-
3 The mathematical derivation of the cost function and ﬁsherman's surplus can be found in Ap-
pendix 4.5.1.
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ing optimization problem reads as follows:
max
∫ ∞
0
e−δt
∑
i=c,s
[
p¯ihi − ci
2
(
hi
xi
)2]
dt (4.4)
s.t. x˙c = gc(xc)− hc,
x˙s = gs(xs, xc)− hs,
xi,initial given; xi,t, hi,t ≥ 0 ∀ t, i ∈ c, s,
yielding in the current value Hamiltonian
Hc =
∑
i=c,s
ui(hi, xi) + λc(gc(xc))− hc) + λs(gs(xs, xc))− hs), (4.5)
where harvest hc and hs are the control variables, and λc and λs denote the shadow
price of the corresponding ﬁsh stock. From the Hamiltonian one obtains 3x2 ﬁrst or-
der conditions of the optimal control problem, along with the transversality conditions
limt→∞ exp (−δt)λit = 0.4 Rearranging the ﬁrst order conditions for optimal harvest
yields
λi =p¯i − cihix−2i ∀ i = c, s. (4.6)
Hence, the shadow price of a stock at the optimal harvest level equals the marginal utility
with respect to harvest. The ﬁrst order conditions for the optimal motion of ﬁsh stocks
can be written as
δ =
λ˙c
λc
+
(
rc(1− 2xc
kc
)
)
− λs
λc
xsµs +
ccχch
2
cx
−3
c
λc
, (4.7)
δ =
λ˙s
λs
+
(
rs(1− 2xs
ks
)− xcµs
)
+
csχsh
2
sx
−3
s
λs
,
4 Apart from the ﬁrst order conditions (4.6), (4.7), and (4.8) Arrow's suﬃciency condition states that if
the maximized Hamiltonian is (strictly) concave with respect to the state variable (xi), for a given value
of the costate variable (λi), then the ﬁrst-order conditions characterize a maximum. See Appendix 4.5.2
for the formal derivation and application to the above optimization problem.
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which implies that each stocks own rate of return has to equal the discount rate δ. Note
that the conditions (4.6) do not include any interactions between ﬁsheries. In contrast,
the two conditions for the optimal motion of ﬁsh stocks both depend on the two ﬁsh
stocks. Lastly, the population dynamics in (4.1) have to hold:
∂Hc
∂λi
=gi(xi, xj)− hi = x˙i. (4.8)
Taking the time derivative of (4.6), along with (4.6) and (4.8) in (4.7), allows me to
solve for h˙, the optimal harvest dynamics:
h˙c = −x
2
c
cc
[(
δ − ∂gc
∂xc
)
λc − ∂gs
∂xc
λs −∂uc
∂xc
− 2cchc
x3c
(gc − hc)
]
= h˙c(xc, xs, hc, x˙c),
h˙s = −x
2
s
cs
[(
δ − ∂gs
∂xs
)
λs −∂us
∂xs
− 2cshs
x3s
(gs − hs)
]
= h˙s(xc, xs, hs, x˙s).
(4.9)
These diﬀerential equations describe the change in harvest as a function of the current
level of stock size and harvest. The optimal dynamics for harvest (4.9) and the population
dynamics (4.1) form the four dimensional dynamical system that depends on the two
control variables, hi, and the two state variables, xi, only:

x˙c
x˙s
h˙c
h˙s

=

x˙c(xc, xs, hc, hs)
x˙s(xc, xs, hc, hs)
h˙c(xc, xs, hc, hs)
h˙s(xc, xs, hc, hs)

. (4.10)
The diﬀerential equations for harvest (4.9) emerge from the optimality conditions and
can thus be seen as 'endogenous'. In contrast to that, the two diﬀerential equations for
the stock size (4.1) that are part of the initial optimization problem (4.4) can be viewed
as 'exogenous'. The dynamical system (4.10) is in a steady state if harvest, stock, and
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shadow prices are constant over time:
x˙i = λ˙i = h˙i = 0 for i = c, s.
In the optimal control problem described above, it is optimal to drive the stock and
harvest to a certain steady state level. Given this and the endogenous and exogenous
parts in the system of diﬀerential equations (4.10), a steady state can be at most 'saddle-
stable'.5
Using the steady state condition above along with (4.6) and (4.8) in (4.7), and solving
the resulting two steady state conditions, I obtain convex isoclines for the two ﬁsh stocks.6
The predator isocline depends on parameters from both the predator and prey ﬁshery:
xs = fc(xc, rc, rs, kc, ks, µs, p¯c, p¯s, cc, cs, δ)
with
∂xs
∂xc
< 0 and
∂2xs
∂x2c
> 0. (4.11)
Since the size of the predator stock directly aﬀects the prey stock via the interaction term
µs, and the social planer considers this in her optimization problem, the parameters of
the prey ﬁshery are included in the predator isocline. The species interaction is however
not reciprocal: the prey does not feed back on the predator. Thus, the prey isocline
depends on parameters of the prey ﬁshery only:
xc = fs(xs, rs, ks, µs, p¯s, cs, δ)
with
∂xc
∂xs
< 0 and
∂2xc
∂x2s
> 0. (4.12)
The isoclines represent the optimal steady state combinations of predator and prey
stock for each ﬁshery. The dynamical system (4.10) is in a steady state when the isoclines
5 The stability of the dynamical system is derived via the eigenvalues of its Jacobian matrix (see (4.30)
in Appendix 4.5.1 for details). In the following, the notation of 'saddle stability' is used to indicate
stability properties of steady states. However, when considering a 2-dimensional system of only stock
sizes where harvest is an optimal feedback policy, instead of the 4-dimensional system above, this 'saddle
stability' translates to 'pure' stability.
6 The isoclines, their slope and curvature are explicitly derived in (4.28) and (4.29) in Appendix 4.5.3.
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intersect. Both isoclines are decreasing and convex curves with respect to the other stock
size. Hence, it is possible that the optimization problem above may result in multiple
steady states implying that there is not only one single optimal harvesting strategy for
the ecosystem.
Fig. 4.1: Possible phase diagrams of the optimally managed ﬁshery. The isoclines are de-
picted as red (prey) and green (predator) curves in the xs-xc space. Steady states
are illustrated by colored dots as indicated in the legend. The dashed line is the
separatrix separating the two basins of attraction of the stable states.
Since both isoclines are convex there may be an arbitrary number of intersection
points. Abstracting from more involved cases with up to inﬁnitely many steady states,
I only describe cases with up to three intersection points in the following discussion.
Possible shapes of the convex isoclines are depicted in the phase diagrams in Figure 4.1.
The steady states along with their stability properties are depicted as black/white dots
in the ﬁgure.7 Panel (a) depicts a case where extinction of the prey species is the unique
equilibrium in the optimally managed ﬁshery. In panel (b) the slope and curvature of the
isoclines is altered such that a second 'coexistence' equilibrium appears at a high level of
7 Stability characteristics are derived by evaluating the sign of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian cor-
responding to the dynamical system (4.10). This is why steady states can be at most saddle stable.
See (4.30) in Appendix 4.5.3 for a description.
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prey but low level of predator biomass. The two basins of attraction of these stable states
are separated by the separatrix that emanates from the unstable node in between. Panel
(c) depicts the case where the unique steady state is characterized by the coexistence of
the prey and predator species. The intersection point of the prey (predator) isocline with
the xs(xc)-axis is denoted by x0s (xc0) in the following.
From (4.12) we know that the red prey isocline solely depends on the parameters of
the prey ﬁshery. In Figure 4.1 we observe that it intersects the vertical xs-axis at the
single species optimum stock level for prey, x0s, which can be written as:
x0s =
(ks
p¯s
cs
+ rs)(rs − δ) +
√
(ks
p¯s
cs
+ rs)2(rs − δ)2 + 4r2s(2ks p¯scs + rs)δ
2rs(csrs + 2ksp¯s)
(4.13)
For rs > δ, the single species prey optimum is always decreasing in the value of the prey
species, p¯s
cs
.8
The maximum predator stock level for which a coexistence equilibrium is viable is at
xc = rs/µs, that is the intersection point of the prey isocline with the horizontal xc-axis.
For any level of predator biomass that exceeds this critical value, the social planer would
ﬁsh down the prey to extinction. On the other hand, the green predator isocline (4.11)
converges to inﬁnity for xc → 0, implying that extinction of the predator is never an
optimal management strategy.9
In Figure 4.1 we observe that the predator isocline intersects the xc-axis at the point
xc0, which can be written as
xc0 =
(kc
p¯c
cc
+ rc)(rc − δ) + cscckcrsµs
2
(
r2c/kc +
cs
cc
kcµ2s + 2kc
p¯c
cc
rc
)
+
√
((kc
p¯c
cc
+ rc)(rc − δ) + cscckcrsµs)2 + 4rcδ(2kc
p¯c
cc
rc + r2c +
cs
cc
k2cµ
2
s)
2
(
r2c/kc +
cs
cc
kcµ2s + 2kc
p¯c
cc
rc
) . (4.14)
8 I furthermore focus on eﬀect of changes in this value of a certain species, e.g. the price (4.3) divided
by the scaling parameter of the cost function (4.2).
9 For δ = 0, the predator isocline intersects with the xs axis at the point
r2c/kc+(
p¯c
cc
rc+ cscc rsµs)
( p¯scs +rs/ks)µs
cs
cc
. However,
the fact that discounting guards the predator stock from becoming extinct is a pure mathematical relic
stemming from the fact that the exponents of hc and xc in the equilibrium cost function (4.2) are the
same.
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Note that xc0 depends not only on parameters of the prey ﬁshery but also on biological
characteristics and harvesting costs (but not the price level) of the prey ﬁshery. In contrast
to x0c, this point does thus not represent the single species optimum predator level. It
must be noted that the eﬀects of changes in the basic value of prey ( p¯s
cs
) or predator ( p¯c
cc
)
on xc0 is ambiguous. Given the characteristics of the above isoclines, the optimal level of
prey and prey stock must fall into the interval x∗s ∈ [0, x0s) and x∗c ∈ (0, xc0] respectively.
Comparing panels (a) and (c) in Figure 4.1, it is clear that depending on the inter-
section of each isocline with the horizontal axis, one can determine whether there exists
a steady state in which only the predator survives: for xc0 > rs/µs extinction of the prey
species is always an optimum. However, since the level of xc0 does not unambiguously
react to parameter changes as derived in (4.14), it remains to be conﬁrmed on a case by
case basis whether extinction of prey is optimal.
Given these results, we see that conclusions on the existence of multiple steady states
and extinction cannot be drawn universally. However, the derived shape of the isoclines
implies that multistability is possible in an optimally managed predator-prey ﬁshery, and
that a larger optimal predator stock is always attended by a smaller optimal prey stock
and vice versa. I derive critical levels for the predator stock that determine whether
extinction of prey is an optimal steady state or the social planner always aims for coex-
istence of both species. The eﬀects of changes in the economic value of each species on
isoclines and critical levels are sketched but cannot be universally determined. Therefore
I present a numerical analysis on how changes in the relative values of the predator and
prey ﬁshery may lead to multiple steady states in the next section. From the derivation
and discussion of the predator and prey isoclines it is clear that the number and loca-
tion of equilibria depend on both ecological and economic parameters. However, here I
focus on how changes in economic parameters aﬀect multistability in optimally managed
ﬁsheries. Therefore, ecological parameters are taken as given in the following case studies.
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4.3 Two Case Studies
The results from the previous section indicated that - depending on the model parameters
- there may be a single or several optimal steady states of the ecosystem, with extinction of
the prey species possibly being one of them. Key parameters that determine the intrinsic
stability of the optimally managed ﬁsheries are hard to determine from a theoretical
perspective. Hence, even in a simpliﬁed model statements regarding the resilience of
optimally managed predator-prey ﬁsheries can only be obtained numerically for diﬀerent
cases. This is exactly what I do in this section.
In the following, two case studies are chosen that represent diﬀerences in the relative
economic value of predator and prey while keeping constant as many other factors as
possible. By restricting the focus on the eﬀects of changes in economic parameters, that
is prices p¯i and costs ci, the following discussion of both systems allows for a more practical
view on optimal ﬁshing and resilience of the ecological-economic systems.
Here I look at the Baltic cod and sprat, and the Newfoundland cod and snow crab
ﬁshery. Both ecosystems experienced a regime shift in the late 1980s/early 1990s that
led to a decline in the cod stocks and an increase in the respective prey biomass. For the
Baltic sea case this regime shift is extensively discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis (Fricke
and Quaas, 2015b). For both, Newfoundland cod and Baltic cod eﬀort is made to rebuild
the cod stocks to historic levels before the regime shift. The application of the model
to the two ﬁsheries therefore additionally informs us whether these strategies appear
reasonable for the respective ﬁshing industries as a whole. Note that the aim of this
paper is not to explain previous regime shifts (that happened in de facto unregulated
regimes) but to investigate the possibility of multistability optimally managed ﬁsheries.
4.3.1 Background
The Baltic Sea commercial ﬁshery is mainly dominated by three species, namely cod,
herring, and sprat (STECF, 2013).10 Suggested interactions between cod and sprat in-
10 Herring is ignored in this case since biological interactions are not as clear as interactions between
cod and sprat.
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Fig. 4.2: Timeseries of stock and harvest data from ICES (2013a,d); DFO (2014, 2013). The
left panels depict the stock development in the Baltic Sea and Newfoundland, the
right panels the corresponding harvest development.
clude cod predation on sprat while sprat may prey on cod eggs/larvae and impose food
competition for young cod (Lindegren et al., 2009). The top left panel of Figure 4.2
illustrates that since the early 1980s cod stocks (green) plummeted, while sprat biomass
(red) increased using data from ICES (2013a,d). A regime shift from a cod towards a
sprat dominated state of the Baltic in the late 1980s has been extensively investigated
(Moellmann et al., 2009). Following the stock development, cod landings peaked in early
1980s followed by a swift decline in spite of high eﬀort levels (ICES, 2013c). Simultane-
ously, catches of sprat increased substantially in the 1980s and 1990s. This is shown in
the top right panel of Figure 4.2.
In Newfoundland and Labrador the cod ﬁshery has historically been of dominant
economic importance until a massive decline in the cod population in the 1980s and the
oﬃcial collapse of the northern cod stock in the 1990s. Ecologists suspect that the marine
ecosystem at the Canadian east coast has shifted towards a new regime, where cod stocks
remain at a low level while other species, especially cod prey, remain abundant (Bundy
and Fanning, 2005; Worm and Myers, 2003; Rice, 2002; Bundy, 2001). Canada imposed
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a moratorium for the cod ﬁshery in 1992. It remained closed for more than 20 years,
during which invertebrates (northern shrimp, snow crab, American lobster) increased in
abundance (Boudreau et al., 2011; Frank et al., 2005; Worm and Myers, 2003). Because
harvest rates of these valuable species increased, the total value of Newfoundland landings
increased by about 60% in real terms from 1990 to 2002 (Schrank, 2005). As of today,
these ﬁsheries are the most valuable in Atlantic Canada, despite the recent decline in
abundance of Snow Crab (DFO, 2013). The bottom part of Figure 4.2 illustrates mainly
the development of the cod stock (left panel) and harvest (right panel) over time using
data from DFO (2014, 2013). For snow crab only few data points on stock and harvest
rates are available.
4.3.2 Results
Table 4.1 lists parameters used for the simulation of both ecosystems. Whenever possi-
ble, parameters are chosen from previous empirical estimates. Estimates for population
dynamics of Baltic cod are taken from Quaas et al. (2012). The intrinsic growth rate of
cod r for Newfoundland cod is set to the same level while its carrying capacity k stems
from the maximum estimated biomass in 1962 (Haedrich and Hamilton, 2000). For snow
crab and sprat no estimates on biological parameters are available, thus parameters are
calibrated to ﬁt stock level and growth estimates from DFO (2013) and ICES (2013d).
Baltic Sea Newfoundland
Parameter Cod Sprat Cod Snow Crab
r 0.7 0.7 0.7 1
k 1.8 3 3 0.4
µ - 0.5 - 0.8
p¯
c
4.8 0.3 3.6 13.5
δ 0.03
Tab. 4.1: Overview of calibrated parameters. r is the intrinsic growth rate, k the capacity
limit, µ the interaction parameter, p¯c the economic value of a ﬁshery, and δ the
discount rate.
Finally, the economic parameters ( p¯
c
) are calibrated under the assumption that the ﬁsh-
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eries were open-access in the period of record.11 I assume that the social planer optimizes
ﬁsheries where the ecological parameters are taken as given. Thus, my main focus here is
to explore the eﬀect of changes in the economic parameters p¯ and c on the number and
location of equilibria in both cases. In the following, I discuss the eﬀect of prey price
changes which increase the economic value of the prey ﬁsheries. A short discussion of
changes in prey costs can be found in Appendix 4.5.4. Eﬀects of changes in the predator
price and cost level are not discussed explicitly since they provide no additional informa-
tion: A decrease in the value of cod ceteris paribus yields very similar results than the
increase in the value of sprat.
Fig. 4.3: Equilibria and bifurcation diagram for the Baltic Sea. Parameters as in Table 4.1
unless indicated otherwise. Panels (a)-(c) depict phase diagrams for diﬀerent levels
of the basic value of sprat. Sprat isoclines are in red, cod isoclines in green. Black
dots indicate saddle stable equilibria, white dots indicate unstable nodes. Panel
(d) illustrates the development of steady states for a continuously changing basic
value of sprat.
11 A more detailed discussion of the calibration process can be found in Appendix 4.5.4.
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Baltic Sea
The optimally managed Baltic Sea ﬁshery for diﬀerent levels of the economic value of prey
(sprat) is depicted in Figure 4.3. Panels (a)-(c) illustrate diﬀerent states of the system
for several economic values of the sprat ﬁshery, starting from the calibrated p¯s
cs
= 0.3 and
ending at the very high value corresponding to the Newfoundland snow crab ﬁshery ( p¯s
cs
=
13.5). The three phase diagrams show how an increase in the economic value of sprat
inﬂuences the sprat (in red) and cod (in green) isoclines and the resulting equilibrium.12
From the fact that xc0 does not react to changes in p¯s (as determined in (4.14)) and
that xc0 lies below rsµs , one can deduct that for the Baltic sea system coexistence of both
species must be always one possible optimal steady state. This is observable in panel
(a)-(c) of Figure 4.3: there is only one saddle-stable steady state characterized by the
coexistence of cod and sprat, although the cod stock level is very low in panel (c). 13
The single species optimal level of sprat x0s decreases with an increasing value of
the sprat ﬁshery since leaving ﬁsh in the water becomes less proﬁtable (as determined
in (4.13)). However, this eﬀect is dominated by the change in the shape of the cod
isocline. Its slope increases and curvature decreases in p¯s. An increase in the value of
sprat thus leads to an increase in the optimal level of sprat and decrease in the optimal
level of cod biomass.
The bifurcation diagram in panel (d) illustrates the changes in optimal cod and sprat
steady state biomass for a continuously increasing value of the sprat ﬁshery. With its
increasing economic value, sprat becomes more and more dominant in the ecosystem.
However, this change is continuous, and lacking sudden shifts from one to another steady
state. The optimally managed Baltic sea ﬁshery is thus quite resilient with respect to
changes in prices and costs.
Given the originally calibrated values of both ﬁsheries from Table 4.1 corresponding
12 In this numerical exercise, p¯s is increased and cs = 1 held constant in this ﬁgure as the system proves
to be much more variable with respect to price changes compared to changes in the cost parameter. A
corresponding ﬁgure for change in costs cs instead of prices is depicted in Figure 4.6 in Appendix 4.5.4.
The same is true when looking at changes in predator value levels: the system is more resilient with
respect to changes in cc then to changes in pc (unreported result).
13 For the single derived steady state two eigenvalues of the Jacobian (4.30) are negative, two positive.
The optimality can be conﬁrmed by using Arrow's optimality condition in Appendix 4.5.2: ∆1 < 0,
∆2 > 0 (unreported results).
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to panel (a) in Figure 4.3, it appears that current eﬀorts to rebuild the cod stock are
indeed the optimal management strategy for the Baltic sea.
Fig. 4.4: Equilibria and bifurcation diagram for Newfoundland. Parameters as in Ta-
ble 4.1 unless indicated otherwise. Panels (a)-(c) depict phase diagrams for dif-
ferent levels of the basic value of snow crab. Snow crab isoclines are in red, cod
isoclines in green. Black dots indicate saddle stable equilibria, white dots indi-
cate unstable nodes. Panel (d) illustrates the development of steady states for a
continuously changing basic value of snow crab. Saddle stability is indicated by
continuous lines, unstable nodes by dashed lines.
Newfoundland
Optimal steady states in the Newfoundland ﬁshery for varying levels of the economic
value of prey (snow crab) are depicted in Figure 4.4. Again, panels (a)-(c) show the
isoclines for cod and snow crab in the xs-xc plane.14 We observe that xc0 > rsµs in case of
the Newfoundland cod and snow crab ﬁshery, thus, extinction of snow crab is always one
optimal (saddle-stable) steady state in this ecosystem.
14 Here again, p¯s is increased and cs = 1 held constant for the same reasons than before. A correspond-
ing ﬁgure for change in costs cs instead of prices is depicted in Figure 4.7 in Appendix 4.5.4. The critical
price level of cod corresponding to panel (b) is p¯c = 2.1.
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An increase in the value of snow crab leads to a decrease in its single species optimum,
x0s. Again, the eﬀect of changes in ps/cs on the shape of the cod isocline dominates the
situation.
Panel (b) depicts the system given the 'critical' economic value p¯s
cs
= 19.1 for which
the cod and snow crab isocline are tangent to each other at a second (unstable) state of
the system. Panel (c) shows that when increasing the value of snow crab further, the
cod isocline turns downwards such that two new steady states (one saddle stable and one
unstable) appear, while the original 'extinction' steady state remains in place.15
The emerging stable state is a coexistence optimum at a very low level of cod corre-
sponding to a high level of snow crab. The state space is divided by the separatrix that
runs through the unstable node. It separates the state space into two basins of attraction.
Depending on the initial location in the phase diagram, it is optimal for the social planner
to aim at one or the other optimal steady state. A shock on the stock size of one or the
other species could thus have very diﬀerent implications for the optimal management.
The bifurcation diagram in panel (d) illustrates the emergence and location of saddle-
stable and unstable steady states for a continuously increasing value of snow crab in the
Newfoundland setting. At the critical value of snow crab two additional steady states
emerge. One of them is unstable (dashed curve), one of them saddle stable (continuous
curve). The optimally managed Newfoundland ﬁshery system is thus less resilient for
high values of the prey species snow crab. However, given the originally calibrated value
of snow crab ( p¯s
cs
= 13.5), the single optimal steady state is characterized by the extinction
of snow crab. Hence, also for the Newfoundland ﬁshery current eﬀorts to rebuild the cod
stock up to its historic size is consistent with the model's suggested optimal management
strategy.
Comparing the two case studies from Figures 4.3 and 4.4, we ﬁnd that while the
relative economic value of both species aﬀects the location of the optimal steady states, an
eﬀect on the resilience or multistability cannot be predicted with certainty. In particular,
15 In case of the extinction steady state, two eigenvalues of the Jacobian (4.30) are negative, two equal
zero. In case of the coexistence steady state in panel(c), two eigenvalues are negative, two positive. The
optimality of both is conﬁrmed by using Arrow's optimality condition in Appendix 4.5.2: ∆1 < 0, ∆2 > 0
(unreported results).
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the behavior of the isoclines at very low levels of prey biomass (the position of xc0 relative
to rs
µs
) seems to determine whether the system is inclined to bifurcate or not. When the
system is inclined to bifurcate (as is the case for Newfoundland), a higher economic value
of the prey species compared to the predator appears to facilitate multistability.
4.4 Conclusion
In this paper I analyzed how changes in market values of interacting species aﬀect the
character and the resilience of an optimally managed ﬁshery. I thereby contribute further
to the discussion of why optimal managed ﬁsheries may lead to regime shifts, which
has been attributed to the quality of institutions (Horan et al., 2011), preferences for
consumption diversity, and the discount rate (Quaas et al., 2013).
In the theoretical part I derived the dynamic system of an optimally harvested predator-
prey ﬁshery making use of a simpliﬁed version of the model in Fricke and Quaas (2015a,b)
in previous chapters of this thesis. This allowed me to explore the location and number
of possible steady states for some speciﬁc situations. I determined critical levels for the
predator stock that indicate whether extinction of prey is optimal or the social planner
always aims for coexistence of both species. The shape of the derived system's isoclines
imply that multistability is possible. Still, the structure of the model is too complex to
formally investigate the eﬀect of the economic values of each species on the emergence of
multiple steady states.
Therefore, I relied on two case studies to illustrate how changes in the relative values
of the predator and prey ﬁshery may lead to multiple steady states depending on the
characteristics of the ﬁshery. The two case studies chosen are the Baltic Sea cod and
sprat, and the Newfoundland cod and snow crab ﬁshery. The predator belongs to the
same species in both cases while the prey ﬁsheries diﬀer greatly in biological and eco-
nomic characteristics. While the biological diﬀerence are obvious - sprat being a small
pelagic species while snow crab is a large invertebrate - the interesting economic diﬀerence
between these ﬁsheries is their diﬀerent economic value. In the Baltic sea, sprat is low
priced and mainly used as ﬁsh fodder, while in Newfoundland snow crab is a high priced
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gourmet food.
The economic and ecologic diﬀerences lead to very diﬀerent implications for the ﬁsh-
eries, that may appear counter-intuitive. Given the current economic value of the ﬁsheries,
it would be optimal to aim at a coexistence state of Baltic cod and (low valued) sprat,
where both species are harvested on a medium level. In contrast, the optimal harvested
Newfoundland ﬁshery would lead to a collapse of (high priced) snow crab and to a high
level of cod stocks.
Thus, optimal extinction of a species does not seem to be driven by its low economic
value but by the ecological side of the model. Stronger predator-prey interactions and/or
smaller carrying capacities may thus foster optimal extinction in optimally managed
ﬁsheries.
The results also imply that an increase in the economic value of the prey relative to
its predator may lead to multistability and thus a decrease in the resilience of the system
depending on the ecological conditions. The two case studies revealed that the optimally
managed Baltic sea ﬁshery is much more resilient than the Newfoundland ﬁshery. For
an increasing value of the prey species, the optimal state of the Baltic sea ecosystems
shifts smoothly from cod towards sprat domination, while for Newfoundland bifurcation
and sudden regime shifts occur after a critical level is reached. Thus, in a system that
is inclined to bifurcate, an increasing economic value of the prey species compared to
the predator seems to decrease the resilience by increasing the number of optimal steady
states.
This study can only be another step to understanding the economic drivers of regime
shifts in optimally managed ﬁsheries. While I chose a simpliﬁed model here to show
some analytical results, it would be quite interesting to discuss the eﬀects of local factor
and/or output markets on the resilience by loosening the restrictions on prices and costs.
Furthermore, I focused on more qualitative results and did not discuss welfare eﬀects of
diﬀerent management strategies, but it would be useful to apply (a possibly less restricted
version of) the model to a speciﬁc ecosystem and derive implications for ﬁsherman's sur-
plus and proﬁts in order to give concrete policy advise. Lastly, it would be an interesting
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extension to explore the eﬀects of variation in ecological parameters.
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4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 The Theoretical Model
In the following I provide the description of the theoretical model. For the sake of
convenience I omit the subscript i from all equations in this section. However, the reader
is advised to remember that each ﬁshery is characterized by it's own factor markets and
technology.
Harvesting is described by the Gordon-Schaefer production function
h = q E x, (4.15)
means of i.e. labor l and capital k using Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns
to scale:
E = lϕ k1−ϕ (4.16)
with ϕ ∈ (0, 1). The supply functions of both inputs are assumed to be iso-elastic. Both
production factors cannot be transferred between ﬁsheries of diﬀerent species, which
makes sense if the ﬁsheries are very diﬀerent and/or the ﬁshing seasons vary. Supply of
both input factors is thus deﬁned as:
w(l) = ω lζ , (4.17)
r(k) = κ kψ., (4.18)
where ζ (ψ) denote the inverse supply elasticity of labor (capital) and w (r) is the wage
rate (capital rental rate). When supply of labor is perfectly elastic the wage rate equals
the "global" wage rate ω (κ for capital, respectively).
Fishermen minimize their costs to determine their optimal harvest quantity in each
period. They have to take local factor markets into account when they decide on their
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harvest strategy. Solving the representative ﬁrm's cost minimization problem
min
l,k
wl + rk
s.t. Eqs (4.15), (4.16)
leads to the factor demand functions
l =
h
q x
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
r
w
)1−ϕ
, (4.19)
k =
h
q x
(
1− ϕ
ϕ
w
r
)ϕ
, (4.20)
as well as the cost function that is linear in harvest,
c˜(h,w, r;x) =
wϕ r1−ϕ
ϕϕ (1− ϕ)1−ϕ
h
q x
. (4.21)
In labor and capital market equilibrium, the equilibrium wage and capital rental rate is
(using (4.19) in (4.17), (4.20) in (4.18) respectively):
w = ω lζ = ω
(
h
q x
)ζ (
ϕ
1− ϕ
r
w
)ζ (1−ϕ)
, (4.22)
r = κ kψ = κ
(
h
q x
)ψ (
1− ϕ
ϕ
w
r
)ψ ϕ
. (4.23)
Using (4.22) and (4.23) in (4.21), the market equilibrium cost function becomes
c(h, x) = c
(
h
x
)e+1
,
with
c = q−(e+1)
(
ω
ϕ
) ϕ (1+ψ)
1+ψ ϕ+ζ (1−ϕ)
(
κ
1− ϕ
) (1−ϕ) (1+ζ)
1+ψ ϕ+ζ (1−ϕ)
> 0
and
e = ζ
ϕ(1 + ψ)
1 + ζ(1− ϕ) + ψϕ + ψ
(1− ϕ)(1 + ζ)
1 + ζ(1− ϕ) + ψϕ > 0.
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Assuming that ﬁrm's minimize their costs, and assuming that the cost function is quadratic
in harvest (implying ei = 1) following Nieminen et al. (2012), the market equilibrium cost
function can be written as16
ci(hi, xi) = ci
(
hi
xi
)2
. (4.24)
Rents
Worker surplus is deﬁned as the area between the equilibrium wage rate and the inverse
labor supply curve:
WS = weq leq −
leq∫
0
ω lζ dl =
ζ
1 + ζ
ω l1+ζeq =
ζ
1 + ζ
ω−
1
ζ w
1+ζ
ζ
eq
=
ζ
1 + ζ
(
ω(1+ψ)ϕ
(
h
q x
)(1+ζ) (1+ψ) (
κϕ
1− ϕ
)(1+ζ) (1−ϕ)) 11+ψ ϕ+ζ (1−ϕ)
=
ζ
1 + ζ
ωα
(
κϕ
1− ϕ
)β (
h
q x
)1+e
= ϕ
ζ
1 + ζ
c
(
h
x
)1+e
Analogous, capital owner surplus is deﬁned as the area between the equilibrium capital
rental rate and the inverse capital supply curve:
RS =
ψ
1 + ψ
κ−
1
ψ r
1+ψ
ψ
eq
=
ψ
1 + ψ
(
κ(1+ζ) (1−ϕ)
(
h
q x
)(1+ψ) (1+ζ) (
ω (1− ϕ)
ϕ
)(1+ψ)ϕ) 11+ψ ϕ+ζ (1−ϕ)
=
ψ
1 + ψ
κβ
(
ω (1− ϕ)
ϕ
)α (
h
q x
)1+e
= (1− ϕ) ψ
1 + ψ
c
(
h
x
)1+e
Total ﬁsherman surplus then is the sum of capital owner surplus and worker surplus:
FS = WS +RS =
(
ϕ
ζ
1 + ζ
(1− ϕ) ψ
1 + ψ
)
c
(
h
x
)1+e
=
e
1 + e
c
(
h
x
)1+e
(4.25)
In the main text the restriction e = 1 is employed in the equation above.
16 A quadratic cost function simpliﬁes the derivation of analytic results greatly. However, in principal
the restriction of a quadratic cost function is not necessary.
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4.5.2 Second Order Optimality Condition: Arrow
The ﬁrst order conditions (4.6), (4.7), and (4.8) are necessary conditions for an optimum.
Since the Hamiltonian is not concave in with respect to the state (xi) and control (hi)
variable Arrow's theorem requires following type of concavity as a suﬃcient condition for
optimality:
The Hamiltonian is maximized with respect to the control variables, for a given value
of state and costate variable (λi). The optimum values of the control variable is substi-
tuted into the Hamiltonian to derive the maximized Hamiltonian (MH). Arrow states
that if MH is (strictly) concave with respect to the state variable, for the given values of
the costate variable, then the ﬁrst-order conditions characterize an optimum.
Optimal harvest h∗i (xi, λi) can be directly derived from (4.6):
h∗i (xi, λi) =
p¯i − λi
ci
x2i (4.26)
It thus increases in stock size and decreases in the shadow price of the stock.
The maximized Hamiltonian using (4.26), and given the level of λc, and λs is
MHc(xc, xs) =
∑
i=c,s
p¯i
(
p¯i − λi
ci
x2i
)
− ci
2
(
p¯i − λi
ci
x2i
)2
x−2i + λi(gi(xi, xj)−
p¯i − λi
ci
x2i ).
The Hessian of MHc can be written as:
HessianMHc =
∂2MHc∂x2c ∂2MHc∂xc∂xs
∂2MHc
∂xc∂xs
∂2MHc
∂x2s
 =
kc(p¯c−λc)2−2ccrcλccckc −λsµs
−λsµs ks(p¯s−λs)2−2csrsλscsks

By Young's Theorem the maximized Hamiltonian is concave at the point x∗ only if the
Hessian is negative semideﬁnite at that point. The principal minors are
∆1 =
∂2MHc
∂x2c
=
kc(p¯c − λc)2 − 2ccrcλc
cckc
∆2 =
∂2MHc
∂x2c
∂2MHc
∂x2s
−
(
∂2MHc
∂xc∂xs
)2
=
kc(p¯c − λc)2 − 2ccrcλc
cckc
ks(p¯s − λs)2 − 2csrsλs
csks
− λ2sµ2s
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The Hessian is negative semi-deﬁnite if ∆1 < 0, and ∆2 > 0. This needs to be evaluated
at each steady state to determine optimality.
4.5.3 The Steady State Conditions
Using the steady state condition, x˙i = λ˙i = h˙i = 0, along with (4.8) and (4.6) in (4.7),
the two optimal steady state conditions are
for predator:
0 =
(
∂gc
∂xc
− δ
)
∂uc
∂hc
|hc=gc(xc) +
∂gs
∂xc
∂us
∂hs
|hs=gs(xs) +
∂uc
∂xc
|hs=gs(xs),
and for prey:
0 =
(
∂gs
∂xs
− δ
)
∂us
∂hs
|hs=gs(xs,xc) +
∂us
∂xs
|hs=gs(xs,xc). (4.27a)
Or in their extensive form,
0 =
(
rc(1− 2xc
kc
)− δ
)[
p¯c − ccx−2c
(
rcxc(1− xc
kc
)
)]
+ ccx
−3
c
(
rcxc(1− xc
kc
)
)2
(4.27b)
− xsµs
[
p¯s − csx−2s
(
rs xs (1− xs
ks
)− µs xs xc
)]
and ,
0 =
((
rs (1− 2xs
ks
)− µs xc
)
− δ
)[
p¯s − csx−2s
(
rs xs (1− xs
ks
)− µs xs xc
)]
+ csx
−3
s
(
rs xs (1− xs
ks
)− µs xs xc
)2
. (4.27c)
Solving (4.27b) for xs and plugging it into (4.27c), it is possible to derive one single
steady state condition solely dependent on xs.
Rewriting (4.27b) ( (4.27c) respectively) in terms of xs (xc respectively) one derives
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the isoclines for the predator ﬁshery as,
xs =
rc
kc
(
rc(1− xckc )− δ
)
+ p¯c
cc
(
rc(1− 2xckc )− δ
)
+ rcδ
xc
+ cs
cc
µs(rs − µsxc)
µs(
rs
ks
+ p¯s
cs
) cs
cc
with
∂xs
∂xc
= −2
p¯c
cc
rc/kc + (rc/kc)
2 + rcδ/x
2
c + cs/ccµ
2
s
(p¯s + csrs/ks)µs/cc
< 0 (4.28)
and
∂2xs
∂x2c
=
2rcccδ
µsx3c(csrs/ks + p¯s)
> 0.
and the prey ﬁshery as,
xc =
(δ + rs
xs
ks
+ p¯s
cs
xs)
(
rs(1− xsks )
)
+ p¯s
cs
xs(rs
xs
ks
+ δ)
(δ + rs
xs
ks
+ p¯s
cs
xs)µs
,
with
∂xc
∂xs
= −
rs
(
δ + 2 p¯s
cs
xs
)2
− 2rs
(
p¯s
cs
)2
x2s + r
3
s(xs/ks)
2 + δ2ks
p¯s
cs
+ r2sxs/ks(2csδ + 3
p¯s
cs
xs)
µs(δks + rsxs + ks
p¯s
cs
xs)2
< 0
(4.29)
and
∂2xc
∂x2s
=
2δ2
(
p¯s
cs
)2
µs(δ + rsxs/ks +
p¯s
cs
xs)3
> 0.
The stability of a steady state is determined by linearizing the dynamic system de-
scribed in (4.10), resulting in the following system:

x˙c
x˙s
h˙c
h˙s

=

∂gc
∂xc
0 −1 0
∂gs
∂xc
∂gs
∂xs
0 −1
∂h˙c
∂xc
∂h˙c
∂xs
∂h˙c
∂hc
∂h˙c
∂hs
∂h˙s
∂xc
∂h˙s
∂xs
∂h˙s
∂hc
∂h˙s
∂hs

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡J

dxc
dxs
dhc
dhs

. (4.30)
The four eigenvalues (EV ) of the Jacobian matrix J in the steady states determine the
stability of the respective state. Typically, an equilibrium of an optimal control problem
can be at most saddle-stable. That is, at least one eigenvalue will be positive.
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Fig. 4.5: Calibrated Population Dynamics using parameters from Table 4.1. The top panels
depict the growth function of Baltic cod and Baltic sprat for diﬀerent levels of
cod biomass. The bottom panels depict the same for Newfoundland cod and snow
crab.
4.5.4 Parametrization and Numerical Simulation
Figure 4.5 illustrates the calibration of the Baltic Sea and the Newfoundland predator-
prey ﬁsheries. The parameters for Baltic cod population dynamics are taken from Quaas
et al. (2012), rc = 0.7 and kc = 1.8 mio tonnes. Being the same species (Gadus morhua),
the intrinsic growth rate of Newfoundland cod is set to the same level rc = 0.7. Haedrich
and Hamilton (2000) provide time series of Newfoundland cod estimates. The maximum
estimated stock size in 1962 is taken as carrying capacity, kc = 3 mio tonnes.
Parameters for Baltic sprat and snow crab are calibrated using expert opinion along
with visual judgment with respect to stock and growth estimates and presumed popula-
tion dynamics (4.1).
Parameters for the economic part of the model (p
c
) are derived by assuming open
access conditions in all four ﬁsheries over the observation period. Rearranging the zero-
proﬁt condition c(x, h) = p h for p
c
one derives p¯
c
= h
x2
, that can be used to determine the
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economic parameters.
Following the criterion for de facto open access from Quaas et al. (2012), Baltic cod
and sprat can be considered open access until 2012.17
For Newfoundland a total allowable catch (TAC) management for cod was imple-
mented in the mid 1970s but was never binding until the moratorium in 1992. For snow
crab the open access assumption is not perfectly convincing. However, assuming that
the management would lie somewhere in between open access and optimal management,
and using the derived optimal harvest condition (4.26), it is obvious that the estimated
open access parameter ps
cs
must be somehow an upper bound. Figure 4.4 shows that for
lower initial ps
cs
, the phase diagram and bifurcation analysis would qualitatively remain
the same.
Bifurcation: Other parameters
Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 depict again changes in the value of the prey species for the
Baltic and the Newfoundland ecosystem. In these ﬁgures, however, instead of increasing
prices cost are decreased accordingly. Obviously, both ecosystems are much more resilient
with respect to changes in cost parameters than with respect to changes in prices. Since
in the proposed model the cost function strongly depends on the stock size, the stock
eﬀect may dominate the eﬀect of changing ci.
17 The criterion is: A ﬁshery is considered de facto open-access when in at least three consecutive years
the catch was less than 90% of the total allowable catch (TAC) and no additional management measures
are in place. This is true for all considered Baltic ﬁsheries (ICES, 2013a,d).
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Fig. 4.6: Equilibria and bifurcation diagram for the Baltic Sea depicting changes in cs.
Parameters as in Table 4.1 unless indicated otherwise. Panels (a)-(c) depict phase
diagrams for diﬀerent levels of the basic value of sprat. Sprat isoclines are in red,
cod isoclines in green. Black dots indicate saddle stable equilibria, white dots
indicate unstable nodes. Panel (d) illustrates the development of steady states for
a continuously changing cs.
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Fig. 4.7: Equilibria and bifurcation diagram for theNewfoundland depicting changes in cs.
Parameters as in Table 4.1 unless indicated otherwise. Panels (a)-(c) depict phase
diagrams for diﬀerent levels of the basic value of snow crab. Snow crab isoclines
are in red, cod isoclines in green. Black dots indicate saddle stable equilibria, white
dots indicate unstable nodes. Panel (d) illustrates the development of steady states
for a continuously changing cs.
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